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IN 1917 and 1918 there grew up a fully authorised but informal and unofficial system of liaison between London and Washington. It was a convenient by-pass to the main stream of diplomatic relations, and conveyed not only facts but impressions and personal reactions of people, official or otherwise. Colonel Murray, at one time Assistant Military Attaché in Washington and M.P. throughout the war, was specially qualified to carry on this work. Associated with him was Sir William Wiseman, of the British Intelligence Service in the United States, the intimate friend of Colonel House, who was the most direct approach to President Wilson. Letters in this correspondence are the foundation of this book in which many famous names appear: Asquith, Lloyd George, Balfour, Grey, Churchill, Reading, Northcliffe, etc. To this account of liaison Colonel Murray adds some very interesting records of his great personal friendship with President Roosevelt.



AT CLOSE QUARTERS

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THE FIVE SONS OF "BARE BETTY"  
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
THE RT. HON. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.,  
AFTERWARDS 1ST EARL OF BALFOUR, K.G.

# AT CLOSE QUARTERS

A SIDELIGHT ON ANGLO-AMERICAN  
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

BY

LT.-COL. HON. ARTHUR C. MURRAY



"Our impressions of what is passing around us vary so rapidly and so continually, that a contemporary record of opinion differs very widely from the final and mature judgment of history: yet the judgment of history must be based upon contemporary evidence."

HENRY REEVE

*Editor of The Greville Memoirs*

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## FOREWORD

IN a previous memoir, *Master and Brother*, I introduced to the reader some of the personalities in American official circles during the period I was Assistant Military Attaché to the British Embassy at Washington from the summer of 1917 to the spring of the following year. I also touched upon the great work done for his country and the Allied cause by Sir William Wiseman, who was a close friend of Colonel House, and was held in high regard by President Wilson. I referred briefly to Wiseman's activities in conjunction with Colonel House in the domain of British-American co-operation for war purposes, and I said that I hoped the time would come—sooner rather than later—when the full story of those activities would be told. In these pages the salient facts of the story are set forth, and I have felt it not inappropriate to supplement them with reminiscences in which my associations with Wiseman played a part, particularly these relating to the Irish question which had considerable importance in America at that period, or which arose from friendships that I formed with President Roosevelt and others in "First World War" days.

A. C. M.



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## CHAPTER I

### *The First World War : Communications between the British and American Governments through Sir William Wiseman and Colonel E. M. House*

SIR WILLIAM WISEMAN, born in 1885, was the 10th Baronet of his line, a descendant of Sir John Wiseman, one of the auditors of the Exchequer in the reign of Henry VIII, who was knighted for his bravery at the action of Guinegate called the Battle of Spurs. As a Captain, aged thirty, in the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry—invalided home after being gassed, and temporarily blinded, at Ypres—he went, seeking other duties, to see a General at the War Office towards the end of 1915. In the room at the time was a Naval officer (of the Intelligence Service) who—after Wiseman's name had been noted for employment—asked him to wait outside. On coming out, the officer introduced himself as an erstwhile Naval shipmate of Wiseman's father, and after further conversation it was arranged that Wiseman should cross the Atlantic to take charge of the Naval officer's organisation in the United States. Whatever the mental abilities of his forbears—and of them I have no knowledge—*this* Wiseman inherited an appropriate name ! His new duties—as British and Americans who worked with him at the time will remember—were performed with marked success.

In the autumn of 1916, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador to the United States, had occasion to send a confidential message to Colonel House and entrusted Wiseman with it. It was in this way that Wiseman met House for the first time. From the meeting quickly sprang up a very intimate friendship between the two, a friendship which, in the next few years, was to serve the cause of the Allies and Associated Powers well and truly. Colonel House, it will be remembered, was—up to the penultimate stages of the Paris Peace Conference—President Wilson's closest friend and adviser. To House fell the continuous task of advising on the President's policies, and of endeavouring to maintain a stable equilibrium on both sides of the Atlantic between statesmen of very varying characteristics and dispositions. And in this task, after the meeting between him and Wiseman had taken place, Wiseman was to play a momentous

and memorable part. Very largely as a result of the visits of Colonel House to Europe before the war ; and of the contacts and friendships he had made with British statesmen—more particularly with Sir Edward Grey and Arthur Balfour—it gradually became the habit for Grey, as Foreign Secretary, and, later, Arthur Balfour, to exchange messages of an intimate and confidential nature with President Wilson *through* Colonel House. The British and American Ambassadors in Washington and in London respectively were aware of these communications, though they were not always aware of their nature. Shortly after Colonel House and Wiseman had met, and their friendship had begun to grow more intimate, House was wont to discuss with Wiseman various matters, political and otherwise, that were the subject of messages, via himself, between the President and the Foreign Secretary in London, and vice versa. In this way Wiseman was gradually drawn into the political net, whilst at the same time he continued to administer his Intelligence Organisation. It will be appreciated that the nature of this Organisation gave him direct facilities for communicating secretly by cable with London, and, as time wore on, these facilities came to be used—with the full knowledge, of course, of his superiors in London—for confidential communications which passed between the President and the Foreign Secretary via House, himself and the Private Secretary at the Foreign office, Sir Eric Drummond (later the Earl of Perth). From this brief account it will be seen that this channel of communication just “grew up”, and was not the product of any deliberate planning. In fact it may be said that it grew up—as do so many things in life—from a chance meeting and friendship. The Ambassadors, as I have previously observed, knew what was going on, and it is not unnatural that they displayed no particular enthusiasm for a procedure which continually by-passed them ! On the other hand, looking back on these out-of-the-ordinary activities, I have no hesitation in saying that they were a most valuable contribution—in complex circumstances—to the smooth working of American-British governmental relations, and to the successful operation of the Allied war machine. And this was particularly so having regard to the mental characteristics of President Wilson. He was a man whose inclination it was to work alone, and to make up his mind by himself. On the other hand, if there happened to be a man or men in whom he placed complete

confidence he was—at any rate up to a later and fatal period—willing to take their advice. He had confidence in and took the advice of Colonel House, and very shortly—after House had brought about a meeting between them—came to like and to admire William Wiseman and to place confidence in his judgment and opinions. It followed that, as time progressed, the advice given by House to Wilson on important matters connected with the Allied war effort was more often than not—and increasingly so—the combined advice of House and Wiseman, after discussion and conversation between the two. In London Sir Eric Drummond “played up” in broad-minded manner to the unorthodox machine that had obtruded itself upon ordinary Foreign Office procedure. He saw and appreciated its value, and very rapidly became aware—as did first Sir Edward Grey and then Arthur Balfour—of the advantages of having Wiseman’s prudent and far-seeing counsels brought to bear on the communications which were passing from the President to the Foreign Secretary and vice versa. Had Drummond been a Civil servant with a dull and unimaginative turn of mind he would not have encouraged the House-Wiseman machine; but, fortunately, he was quite a different kind of person, and he used the machine actively and continuously to the great advantage of British-American co-operation for war-making purposes.

## CHAPTER II

### *The Author is drawn into the House-Wiseman Circle*

AT this point of the story it may not be inappropriate to show how I began to become absorbed into the House-Wiseman circle. When it was decided to appoint to Washington—after America had come into the war in April 1917—a British Military Attaché and an Assistant Military Attaché with front-line war experience, the War Office suggested to the Foreign Office, for the appointment of Military Attaché, Major-General J. D. McLachlan of the Cameron Highlanders, who had commanded a brigade on the Western Front. Sir Eric Drummond—as he told me at a later date—replied that the Foreign Office would welcome the appointment of General McLachlan as Military Attaché, but that they hoped that the War Office would fall in with their suggestion that I should receive the appointment of Assistant Military Attaché. Drummond, when he told me of this, said that they had naturally accepted the high opinion held by the War Office of McLachlan's military qualifications, but *he* felt that my background as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey during the five years prior to the war, and the friendships I had formed in the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, would probably be very helpful in various ways to him and to Arthur Balfour, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The response of the War Office was that they would gladly agree to my appointment, and accordingly both appointments were duly gazetted. What had taken place behind the scenes was that when the Foreign Office had notified the War Office that they agreed to McLachlan's appointment, the War Office then sent for McLachlan; offered him the post; and said, "the Foreign Office have suggested that Lieut.-Colonel Arthur Murray of the 2nd King Edward's Horse—a Member of Parliament, by the way, if you can put up with that!—should be your Assistant Military Attaché. What have you got to say to that?" "What have I got to say to that?" replied McLachlan. "Why, he is one of my oldest friends! His brother, Alick, the Master of Elibank, and I were at Cheltenham together, and I've known Arthur Murray since he was a boy. I couldn't have wished for a better stroke of luck than to have him with me at Washington.

I'm *delighted*." Needless to say the "delight" was reciprocated, and the work that fell to my lot as Assistant Military Attaché in Washington was rendered infinitely easier and more enjoyable because it was carried out in association with an old and intimate friend.

It will be appreciated from the foregoing that it was a natural thing that from the start of my work in Washington I should keep in close touch with Sir Eric Drummond and that I should never hesitate to write to him if I thought at any time that I could be of assistance to him. It was only natural, too, that my background of Foreign Office and House of Commons activities should tend to make me gravitate all the time that I was engaged on the military side of my duties in Washington to the political problems that confronted British-American co-operation and the British machine in the United States. As an instance of this I quote the following letter which I wrote to Drummond from the British Embassy at Washington on November 1, 1917 :

MY DEAR ERIC,

Wiseman takes this note across with him. I have had long talks with Rufus<sup>1</sup> in regard to the general situation, and the problem to be solved over here. Wiseman will already have apprised you of the solution that seems best fitted to meet the case, viz. several Branches working under a *supreme head*. There may be good reasons against it, but they are not apparent at the moment over here. A shake-up of the present arrangement seems to be absolutely essential, more particularly in view of the re-arrangement at your end.

I had a long talk with Rufus yesterday, and saw Northcliffe immediately afterwards. It will be quite clear to *your* mind that there can be no free, frank and open discussion between the two as to any possible new arrangements, and Rufus has *not* divulged to Northcliffe what is in his mind. I cannot of course say what may happen on the voyage across ! Perhaps the rolling waves of the Atlantic may induce confidences, but I doubt it !

So far as the situation out here is concerned, Northcliffe's mind is turning on changes of a minor character, and if the larger re-arrangement does not take place I am entirely with

<sup>1</sup> The Earl of Reading, in the United States at that time (as a Member of the War Cabinet) in connection with financial and economic problems.

him that the British War Mission should be very greatly strengthened in the character and numbers of its personnel. In any case, something in the nature of the British War Mission would be required as one of the aforesaid "Branches", and it would certainly require to be strengthened as above. If you think advisable you might perhaps say a word to Balfour on these lines.

You will doubtless hear from Northcliffe himself what place he would like in any re-arrangement! So far as I can gather he would like to be the supreme British head of the new organisation whatever be its form.

Looking ahead it seems to me that the successful issue of the war will in a large measure depend on the proper control, management and handling of the situation out here. For the supreme control you may have a better man than Rufus—if so I hope you will send him. But I much wonder whether you can find a man more suited in every way for the job.

Yours ever

ARTHUR MURRAY

The final arrangement (to which the foregoing letter refers) which was made was that early in 1918 Reading was appointed Ambassador and High Commissioner in the United States, with all British official activities under his supreme control.

As time went on—still permitting nothing to interfere with the military side of my duties—I found myself becoming more and more drawn into the political sphere. As Reading and I were old personal and Parliamentary friends it was only natural that we should see a good deal of each other and walk and golf together, and that he should talk to me in intimate fashion on political and international subjects. In addition to that, Sir William Wiseman—who had been on board the ship which brought McLachlan and myself to the United States, and with whom I struck up a close and lasting friendship—had a habit of inviting me from time to time to discuss with him various political problems that arose in the communications that were passing through him and Drummond between the President and House on the one hand and Arthur Balfour on the other. On one of my first visits to New York after I had arrived in Washington—and my military duties took me there not infrequently—Wiseman arranged for me to meet Colonel House. This was

the beginning of an affectionate friendship between House and myself, made at the outset easier by the devotion of each to our common friend Edward Grey. Some months previously at House's suggestion, Wiseman had moved into an apartment in the building in New York in which House lived, and the two used to meet regularly every morning at ten o'clock, and usually, too, at other times during the day. President Wilson at that time—and up to the autumn of 1919—would always see Wiseman whenever the latter rang up the White House and asked for an appointment.

My first meeting with House led to many others. Whenever I was in New York, and sometimes when he was in Washington with or without Wiseman, we used to meet, and many was the occasion when House and Wiseman would drag me into some problem which they were exploring before they communicated with London or into some problem which had arrived from London before they took it up with the President. In this way it will be seen that I became more and more involved in an unofficial manner in the House-Wiseman machine. And in thus becoming involved it became possible for me on more than one occasion to bring the "machine" and Reading, the Ambassador, more closely together in a manner helpful to the latter. Reading himself was somewhat Wilsonian in his methods, and he was not at all averse to using a method of communication with Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, or with Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, which did not pass through the ordinary official Embassy channels, this being particularly so in the case of cables. And there was no reason why he should not so act. He was British Ambassador in the United States at a most momentous time; a member of the War Cabinet; and entirely at liberty to use such channels of communication as were, in his judgment, best suited to fulfil the objectives which he had in view. However that may be, from time to time he would either use the Wiseman secret line direct through Wiseman, or on occasions would ask me to give to Wiseman the confidential messages which he desired to go through to Balfour or Lloyd George. On other occasions if I happened to be in New York, Wiseman might ask me on my return to Washington to give a message to Reading which had come through from London, or to discuss some urgent or difficult problem with him. One day in January 1918, when I was sitting with Wiseman in his apartment in New

York, he said to me that his "machine" required someone at the other end of it in London. He went on to say that the communications—all of an urgent and important nature—were growing rapidly in number, and that Drummond with all his Foreign Office work on his shoulders just could not—as he (Wiseman) and House could see—give to them the attention they required. "In addition to that," said Wiseman, "we *must* hear more of what is going on in London governmental circles, and be kept in touch with the significance of political events. Time and again we hear rumours, passed to us through the State Department or emanating from some other quarter, that Lloyd George has had a row with Arthur Balfour, or that Milner does not see eye to eye with George Curzon, or that the War Cabinet is going to take such-and-such a step, and we are asked by the President what it is all about and we are unable to give an answer. And although our messages through to London giving the President's views on particular matters or seeking advice from Balfour are as definite as we can make them, we often feel that not quite the correct interpretation is being placed upon them. What House and I would like to feel is that we had someone on the other side (who understood the whole situation out here) to whom we could speak quite freely, and who could interpret our views, if necessary, and press home points in a way that would help to make our link between the President and Balfour much more useful than it is. House and I have been talking this over for some little time and we have definitely come to the conclusion that it would be very helpful if you could arrange to go home and take over in the Foreign Office the London end of our machine."

It so happened that at about the time that Wiseman opened up in this fashion and made this suggestion to me, I had been thinking out my own position so far as my work in the United States was concerned. I was beginning to feel that my job as Assistant Military Attaché was becoming more and more of a routine nature, and that perhaps the War Office might think I could be more usefully employed back in the fighting line in France, or, if thought fit, in some post connected with the American Army in France. So when Wiseman made this suggestion to me I told him what had been passing through my mind, and that, although I had not up to that moment talked the matter over with Reading, I was proposing to do so. Wiseman



LIEUT.-COL. SIR WILLIAM WISEMAN, BART., C.B., WHEN OF THE  
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1917-18



urged me not to make up my mind on any project of my own before I had had a real talk with House and himself, and he wrote me the next day to Washington, where I had returned that night from New York, the following letter :

Before you make any decision I should like to have an opportunity of talking things over with you. My friend upstairs and I feel that you can be very valuable to the Cause.

I may be in Washington at the end of next week, but I suggest that, as soon as you have had any definite talk with Reading, you should come up here and see House and myself before coming to any decision.

On receipt of Wiseman's letter I decided to go to New York to see him and House before discussing the matter with Reading. Accordingly, a few days later I went to New York on the midnight express and had a long talk with House and Wiseman, in the course of which they urged upon me the action suggested by Wiseman in his conversation some days previously. At this meeting I told them that Reading himself had frequently said to me that he was not being kept in touch to the extent that he ought to be with "inner circle" happenings in London ; that he did not know what was going on behind the scenes and in the Lobbies of the House of Commons ; and he wished that somehow or other he could be kept more closely "in touch" with day-to-day occurrences and tendencies. If, therefore, I added, I could be of help to House and Wiseman in the sense that *they* desired, I might also be of help to Reading in the sense that *he* desired, and for these reasons, I said, my mind was inclining more and more to fall in with their suggestion. Throughout our conversation both of them put it to me very strongly that their view was that their proposals, if I agreed to them, would make their task infinitely more profitable from the point of view of British-American co-operation.

On my return to Washington I immediately took up the matter with Reading, and told him everything that had passed between House and Wiseman and myself. Reading displayed a generous and broad-minded attitude towards the whole position. As I have previously remarked, he knew of the Wiseman-House communications with Balfour, and had used the channel on occasion himself ; and although, as Ambassador, he was naturally

not particularly enamoured of a machine of this nature, he accepted it in the spirit that it was helpful to British allied co-operation, President Wilson being the kind of man that he was. When I had completed my résumé of the situation and of the proposals which House and Wiseman made to me, he at once said that in all the circumstances he would welcome anything that might help the machine to operate more efficiently, and were I to take over the London end as had been suggested, I could also be of considerable help to him by keeping him closely in touch with all that was going on and representing his views to appropriate quarters when necessary, other than through ordinary official channels. I expressed myself as grateful to him for his generous acceptance of a situation which by its very nature intruded itself on his ambassadorial functions; to which he replied that the fact that we were old and close personal friends made his acceptance possible and easy. I said that one of the things that made the House-Wiseman proposals attractive to me was that I would be in a position, as I hoped, to be really helpful and useful to him in his burdensome task and gigantic responsibilities.

From the moment that Wiseman had first broached the subject to me, I had kept my old friend and military chief, "Jimmie" McLachlan, in touch with what was going on. He had said all along to me that though he would part with me with great regret, nothing must stop me from embarking upon anything which people like Colonel House, Reading and Wiseman might think would be helpful to the Cause. An hour or so after my talk with Reading I saw McLachlan and told him what had taken place. He at once said, "Although I hate you going, I feel perfectly sure that you are going to do a bigger job for the war than you could now do here." Then he added, "But how are you going to get to work to resign your post here and take up the other?" "I had thought of that," I replied, "and I will tell you my plan. But before doing so I must get up to New York and have a talk with Willie Wiseman and Colonel House." Accordingly, I went to New York that night; told Wiseman and House of my conversation with Reading, and said that in the circumstances I was now ready to fall in with their proposals and to do all that I possibly could to help them in their work. But I added that although I accepted their proposals the ultimate acceptance lay with Eric Drummond, and if it so happened that he was not

agrecable to the scheme, then, of course, it must fall to the ground. Wiseman at once said he felt perfectly sure that not only would Drummond agree but that he would do so with great readiness. My own feeling too, knowing Drummond so well, was that Wiseman's view of the matter was correct.

I returned to Washington in order to proceed with the plan that I had evolved in my mind for transferring myself—always assuming Drummond's ultimate agreement—from one post to the other. My plan was this. Every Member of the House of Commons serving with the Forces had the right at any time to notify the War Office that he proposed to take off his uniform and return to his Parliamentary duties. Here then was my "way out"—my road from my post in Washington to the post in prospect in London; always remembering that the post which I proposed to take up was of an unofficial and secret nature. Accordingly, I took immediate steps to put my plan into operation. The Director of Military Intelligence at the time—under whose jurisdiction Military Attachés served—was General Sir George Macdonogh, not only a soldier of great distinction, but an Intelligence officer of outstanding skill and flair. To these high qualifications he added great vision and a broad-minded outlook on life. On retiring from the Army a few years later, Macdonogh entered business and became a most successful Chairman of the International Paint Company. Following out my plan, I sent a cable to Macdonogh saying that I had decided to resign my position as Assistant Military Attaché to the British Embassy in Washington in order to resume my Parliamentary duties in the House of Commons. I knew in sending that cable that neither Macdonogh nor the War Office had the power to prevent me from fulfilling my intention! From Macdonogh came back a cable the next day saying that he had received my cable with great regret, and hoping very much indeed that I would reconsider the matter before coming to a final decision. I thought this was a particularly nice cable for the D.M.I. to send, and I greatly appreciated it. I replied thanking him very much, but adding that I could not see my way to reconsider my decision, the reasons for which decision I would explain to him as soon as I returned to London.

Following immediately on my second cable to the D.M.I., McLachlan cabled him asking for an officer to replace me as Assistant Military Attaché. McLachlan and I had discussed the

matter, and I had said to him that he would be fortunate if he could obtain Major Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bart., of the 2nd Life Guards, who had been Brigade Major to the Canadian Cavalry Brigade when my regiment, the 2nd King Edward's Horse, served in it, and who, in the Second World War, was a highly successful Secretary of State for Air. Accordingly, McLachlan's cable asked that Sinclair should be invited to take my place. The reply from the War Office was that Sinclair's services were not available. Accordingly, we applied for my old friend Major Hon. Charles Lyell, M.P., and he joined us. Lyell was a Major in the Fife and Forfar 4.7" Battery which had gone to France in the early stages of the war. Towards the end of 1916 the infantry line in front of him had been forced back by a sudden German attack. Lyell was ordered to get his Battery away at top speed, but to burn as much of his cordite as possible before retiring. Hastily he had a number of pits dug, into which to throw the cordite and set it on fire. Whilst the process was in operation, Lyell moved about superintending the burning. He came to a pit in which a few moments previously a mass of cordite had been burned. He happened to look over the edge, and just at that moment one of his men threw in some more cordite. With a great flash came a flame out of the pit—some burning particles must still have been left in it. The flame scorched the front of his tunic and badly burned his neck and face. Standing on the edge of the pit as he was, he might easily have fallen forwards into the flame—luckily he fell backwards. He was taken to the rear and evacuated to England, suffering terribly. To all outward appearances he recovered completely, but there can be little doubt that his untimely death after influenza in Washington towards the end of the war was in some measure due to the shock to his system sustained from the burns. His son Antony died gloriously in North Africa in the Second World War in an action which won him posthumously the V.C.

As soon as Lyell arrived in Washington I took steps to hand over to him my duties as Assistant Military Attaché. The remainder of my time in the United States I spent principally with Reading, House and Wiseman discussing the many matters connected with the plans which—in the event of Drummond agreeing—we proposed to put into operation on my arrival in London.

## CHAPTER III

### *Author's Arrival in England*

I SAID farewell to all in the British Embassy and to many good friends in Washington, and sailed from New York for England in the *Adriatic* on March 16, 1918, arriving in London at the beginning of April. The following day I went to the Foreign Office to see Sir Eric Drummond. I had previously cabled him from Washington to say that I was coming back and would see him immediately on my arrival in England. It was very easy for me to talk to Drummond and to explain the whole circumstances to him, as we were old personal friends, and had done a great deal together in the domains of work and play—we were both enthusiastic fishermen ! He did not hesitate for a moment. He gave the scheme a warm welcome. He stressed the importance of the House-Wiseman line of communication between Balfour and Wilson, and said that it would be extremely useful from every point of view were I, with my knowledge of the United States and friendship with Wiseman and House, to take charge of the "line" at the British end. Moreover, he went on, it would take a tremendous burden off his overloaded shoulders, and the sooner I got down to work the better he would be pleased. The putting into operation of the scheme, so far as my part of it was concerned, next required attention, and this, too, was made easy by an old personal friendship.

Sir William (Lord) Tyrrell had been Principal Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey in the Foreign Office during the days that I was Grey's Parliamentary Private Secretary, and Tyrrell and I had established a close and intimate friendship. At the time of which I am writing, Tyrrell was head of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, a Department which had been specially created to handle and to advise upon enemy and international questions generally of a political and "intelligence" nature. Drummond suggested that I should see Tyrrell, and arrange with the latter, if he agreed, to place at my disposal a room at the top of the building and to attach me to the American section of his Political Intelligence Department. This, said Drummond, would give me the necessary facilities for my work, and all the necessary contacts between himself and me could

easily be established and maintained. Accordingly, I went straight up to Tyrrell, and after warm greetings I put the scheme to him. He expressed himself as highly delighted with it, and stressed its usefulness to the Allied cause. He, of course, in his position, had known of the House-Wiseman-Drummond "line"; knew how it had been growing; and also knew, he said, that at this end, through no fault of Drummond's, it was beginning to become "badly strained". "Moreover," he added, "your presence here in this particular capacity will be extremely useful to me and to my Department, as we shall be able through you to obtain important information regarding affairs in the United States. Further, I shall be able to help you with information that is at my disposal to keep Wiseman and Reading thoroughly up to date." Accordingly, there and then, within the space of less than an hour, the whole matter was settled, and settled because there happened to be in these responsible positions at the Foreign Office at that time two such far-seeing, resourceful and broad-minded men as Sir Eric Drummond and Sir William Tyrrell. Tyrrell ended by saying that he would at once make arrangements for a room to be placed at my disposal.

## CHAPTER IV

### *Author's Interviews with Various Personages in London*

PRIOR to my departure from Washington, Reading had asked me to see, on my arrival in London, Arthur (Lord) Balfour, Secretary for Foreign Affairs ; Lloyd George, the Prime Minister ; and Lord Derby, the Secretary for War : to convey certain messages from him to them, and to discuss with them certain matters and problems. But before seeing any of these personages, I went off to the War Office to see Sir George Macdonogh, the Director of Military Intelligence. I have already given my impressions of the high-minded character and broad outlook of this charming and distinguished soldier. He received me at the War Office that day, and said, "Well, what is at the bottom of all this mystery ?" So I told him all about it, and, as he listened to my story, I could see from the first that not only was he intensely interested, but that the plan met with his warm approval. In the nature of things as D.M.I. he had known something of the House-Wiseman-Drummond line of communication, and he looked upon it as an important part of effective and intimate Anglo-American co-operation. As also did his "opposite number" (with whom I established and kept close contact) the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, a man of great charm, and an "Intelligence" officer of the very highest order. At the conclusion of my talk with the D.M.I. regarding the work that I was about to undertake we had a long conversation on American affairs, and I brought him completely up to date with what was taking place in Washington. He then bade me farewell and good luck, and asked me to remember that if at any time he could be of any assistance to me in connection with the work upon which I was about to embark, I was not to hesitate to come at once and see him.

From the D.M.I. I went straight up to the room of my friend, Sir Herbert Creedy, Principal Private Secretary to Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War. Creedy was one of the ablest and most popular Civil servants of my time. From Principal Private Secretary he became at a later date Permanent Under-Secretary at the War Office, and in the Second World War performed admirable service for his country in a Secret Service activity

outside the office which he had so adorned. Whilst I was speaking to Creedy and asking him to make an appointment for me with the Secretary of State, into the room came the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and almost immediately afterwards Clive (Lord) Wigram, Private Secretary to King George V. The Deputy C.I.G.S. said that a meeting of the Army Council was to take place within the next quarter of an hour, and that he would like me to attend it in order that the Council might hear from me the latest position in Washington and put to me any questions they desired. Wigram said to me that he felt sure the King would want to see me, and that he would mention to him my arrival in London. In the meantime Creedy gave me an appointment with Lord Derby for a later time in the day.

I attended the meeting of the Army Council, at which were present, *inter alios*, Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Sir Nevil Macready, Adjutant-General. In the late afternoon I saw Lord Derby. On both occasions the seriousness and gravity of the situation on General Gough's 5th Army Front in France was brought home to me, and many questions were asked me with regard to American military preparations, troop movements and other relevant matters.

I had already asked Eric Drummond to make an appointment for me to see Arthur Balfour, and had telephoned to J. T. Davies, Lloyd George's Private Secretary, to say that I had arrived from Washington, and that Reading had asked me to see Lloyd George for the purpose of conveying certain messages to him. The day after I had seen Derby—upon whom the strain of the precarious situation in France sat *very* heavily—I received a message from J. T. Davies to say that Lloyd George would like me to breakfast with him the following morning; and on the same day, Tuesday, April 2, I received a message from Lord Wigram saying that the King would like to see me on the Thursday at a quarter to three. At nine o'clock on the appointed day I turned up at No. 10 Downing Street for my breakfast with Lloyd George—it was a habit with him during his Premiership, and indeed through all the period that he held office, to begin many of his days by having to breakfast persons whom he had to see on political business at some time or other during the day. Only a man with a very good digestion could do that, and the fact that he did it year after year and yet, shortly before he died at the age of eighty-two,

was able to walk round his farm at Bron-y-de, Churt, is in itself a proof of the fact that indigestion was not a malady from which he was wont to suffer ! Nor did he deserve to suffer from it, because he lived for the most part on simple food, and drank in moderation. When I walked into the room that April morning the first thing he said to me was, "How are you ? Where are all those American Divisions which we were promised would be in France by the spring ?" I said, "What American Divisions do you mean ?" He replied, "Those 15 Divisions." "15 Divisions," I said ; "I have never heard any such figure mentioned officially. And I ought to know, seeing that I have been Assistant Military Attaché in Washington since August of last year. If," I went on, "you will refer to the figures in the War Office that have been coming over from Washington you will find that the American Army in France to-day approximates to the 5 Divisions with one in the line which were promised by the American Authorities late last autumn. I know," I said, "that some newspapers talked about 15 or 20 Divisions, but naturally you wouldn't pay any attention to newspaper reports. It is quite clear, however, that you got hold of unreliable figures. That won't matter very much in one sense, because the War Office here knows what the *real* figures are—we have been supplying them from Washington. On the other hand, it would matter very much indeed if it were thought in Washington that the great military reverses which have been suffered by the 5th Army in France are being ascribed by you and the British Government to having been let down by America in the sense that you have suggested. These things," I went on, "get right back to Washington in no time, and if Washington thinks that you are unjustly blaming them for the British defeat, it will have a very bad effect on British-American relations, and on the course of the war. I do hope," I concluded, "that you won't let any impression like that get back to Washington. It would be disastrous."

I may be permitted to say that perhaps it was fortunate that—being a Member of Parliament and knowing Lloyd George well—I could talk to him *firmly* in the sense that I did. Nothing would more quickly have led to bad blood between London and Washington had it been reported to the latter that the British Prime Minister was casting unjust blame upon the United States for the 5th Army reverses. There was, of course, no answer possible to the statement of the case as I had put it, and, when I

had finished, Lloyd George said, "Well, let's go into breakfast and you can tell me all the latest from Washington and Rufus. How is he?" (Before going any further, I pause to remark in parenthesis that in a speech in the House of Commons on August 7, about four months later, Lloyd George returned to the same unjustified charge that by the spring America had failed to put into the line the number of Divisions which she had promised. By that time, however, the whole position on the Western Front had changed and was moving in favour of the Allies, and his observations doubtless passed unnoticed—or were thought not worth bothering about—in Washington.)

To come back to No. 10 Downing Street: at breakfast I gave to Lloyd George the messages which Reading had asked me to convey to him. We discussed the situation in Washington from various aspects, and a number of matters connected with America's participation in the war. He asked me to convey certain things to Reading, and I agreed to do so. And these actually were the first secret communications which I passed to Wiseman in New York over what I may now call the Wiseman-Murray line.

I lunched with Arthur Balfour that day at his house in Carlton Gardens. I started by telling him various things which Reading wanted him to know, and then gave him messages of warm greetings which Colonel House had asked me to convey to him. From that I told him of the position that House and Wiseman had asked me to assume; and I said that, in this position, I hoped I might be of assistance to him in various ways, apart from taking great loads off Eric Drummond's already over-burdened shoulders. I had felt sure that I knew what the reaction of the imaginative mind of Balfour would be to my story, and I was right. He welcomed the plan wholeheartedly; and said that he was delighted to hear of it, because he felt that it would make more smooth and efficient his means of communication with the President. "The whole thing," he said, "has, of course, been most unorthodox from the beginning, but what does that matter? Anything that helps us to work with the President and the President with us is helping to win the war, and personal feelings and jealousies do not count. I am delighted that you are going to do this, and please give House warm messages from me, and tell him and Wiseman that I am very glad that you've come over here to help them."

At 2.30 on the afternoon of April 4 I presented myself at Buckingham Palace for my audience with the King. Arthur Balfour I had found calm and unruffled, grave though the situation was on the other side of the English Channel. The same could not be said of some of the personages in high positions whom I had seen in London at that time. It was refreshing, but it did not surprise me, to find in King George V a man who viewed the whole dangerous position calmly and confidently, in contrast with the nervousness and high-tension which had met me in some other quarters. And the same may be said of his Private Secretaries, Lords Stamfordham and Wigram, both men of great personal charm, of tact, vision and high honour, who, in their important posts close to the Crown, rendered notable service to their country. I was shown up to a smallish room overlooking the Palace Courtyard, where the King received me in most friendly fashion. I described in *Master and Brother* the occasions on which he had dined from time to time in the House of Commons, in the early years of the 1906 Parliament, with my brother, the Master of Elibank, M.P. (later Chief Liberal Whip), and his visits to the House of Commons in those days. I had had the honour of meeting him in those circumstances at that period, and he remembered the occasions. He asked after my brother, and said that he had not had the pleasure of seeing him lately, but was always glad to see him because he liked him very much and remembered so well all the help he had been to him (the King) in difficult political times. I should have liked to have said to him, "I wonder, Sir, if you remember the message which Lord Stamfordham telephoned from Your Majesty to my brother after the passing of the Parliament Bill in August 1911, namely, 'Give him my congratulations on the passing of the Parliament Bill and on his share in it, but tell him also that he has given me the most infernal time I have ever had in my life!'" But naturally it would have been out of place for me to have said this to His Majesty at that time, although I am certain that had I ventured to do so H.M.—with his great sense of humour—would have greeted my remembrance with a laugh.

After the preliminary greetings, the King moved across to the fire and said, "Now come and sit down and tell me all about the position in America, and how quickly they are going to get their troops across here." So we sat there and talked quietly for over half an hour. I told him the whole position as I knew it,

and he put to me many questions. Throughout our conversation he displayed a sound and knowledgeable grasp of the situation—the gravity of which he impressed upon me—and the manner in which, in his judgment, it was desirable to meet it. He referred to the generous attitude displayed by President Wilson in giving sanction earlier in the year to the amalgamation of American troops in British and French units. I was able to tell him something—but not all—of the manner in which the President's decision had come about. This is an appropriate time and place to tell the whole story in detail, and the outstanding and interesting part played in it by Sir William Wiseman. In order to obtain it in full and at first hand I wrote to Wiseman on December 28, 1943, asking him to relate the whole story to me. He did so in a letter to me dated March 17, 1944. The letter is as follows :

NEW YORK, March 17, 1944

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Referring to your letter of December 28th last, I must apologise for not sending you the information required earlier. You will forgive me, I am sure, when you realise that I have been out west twice since that date and have had a great many things on my mind.

My first idea was to find a quiet week-end and go up to Yale, where all my papers are lodged with the House Collection in a special room in the Library. I began to see, however, that the quiet week-end might be a long time coming, so I wrote to Seymour, who very kindly checked some of the dates for me.

The more, however, I searched my recollection, the more evident it became that the particular matter to which you refer, i.e. : the brigading of American troops with the British, was a matter upon which there were discussions and exchanges of cables covering a period from the very early days of 1918 up to the time that the Germans were turned back in July.

My recollection, verified to some extent by Seymour's dates, is that towards the end of January 1918 Colonel House whom, of course, I saw every day and usually several times a day, was becoming disturbed about the situation. At about the same time I received a long cable from Balfour, asking me to see the President and put the case to him. I studied my brief

as well as I could and went to Washington on February the 3rd, and, as usual, called up Ike Hoover at the White House. After a short interval a message came back, inviting me to lunch with the President. When I got there I found the President and Mrs. Wilson and her secretary and Newton Baker. We discussed generalities at the lunch and then the President asked Baker and myself up to his study. He then asked me to state the case, which I did to the best of my ability. Baker was sympathetic but non-committal, evidently wishing to know more of Pershing's side of the matter. Then the President, to my surprise, politely dismissed Baker and sat down to talk to me again. His words have stuck in my memory and I think I can quote them accurately even now. He said, "It is a very serious thing for a President to override his Commander-in-Chief in the field, but if Pershing is standing in the way, he must be ordered to stand out of the way." He did not indicate that he was prepared to give Pershing such orders, but that he was fully aware of the urgency of the matter and would do whatever he thought right.

Then the President remarked that there was to be a meeting of the Supreme War Council at Abbeville in about two weeks' time, at which this matter was to be determined. He asked me if I could go to Abbeville and explain his views to Pershing. Naturally I was taken aback and tried to explain that it would be very difficult for a British officer to take a message of that importance from the President to Pershing. He immediately agreed and asked if I knew Frazier.<sup>1</sup> I said I knew him well. He then said that he would see that Frazier was instructed, but that he would like me to go to Abbeville and explain verbally to Frazier his, the President's, attitude in the matter. In fact, his attitude was that while, of course, he was as anxious as anyone for the prompt creation of an American Army in the field, under its own Commander, this must not be allowed to endanger the military situation; that he had no means of judging for himself the urgency of the problem, but that if the problem was as urgent as stated by Mr. Balfour, there would seem to be grave risk if Pershing opposed the Allied request.

Apparently the Supreme War Council meeting must have been postponed, because I left for Europe on April the 9th, spent a week or so in London, and went on to Abbeville with

<sup>1</sup> The President's Observer in France.

Lloyd George, Balfour, Milner and others. I remember very well crossing the Channel in a destroyer. At Abbeville I immediately saw Frazier, who had come from Paris, and did my best to explain the situation to him. He, in turn, took the matter up with Pershing before the Supreme Council met. I am sure he did not mention my conversation, but anything he said to Pershing was based on cabled instructions from the State Department.

It seems that in the meantime negotiations had been going on between Pershing and the Allied Commanders, which led to some kind of a compromise that only infantry and machine-gun units of the American Army should be brought to France for the time being, and that the amalgamation of the American troops in the Allied units should be temporarily ratified. The provision was for 125,000 American troops a month, tonnage to be found by the British. Pershing was willing to permit half of these American troops to be brigaded, but any excess of American forces over 60,000 troops a month to be utilised to complete purely American divisions. This did not satisfy the Allied Commanders and, as a result of the Abbeville conference to which I have referred, which apparently took place in the early days of May, Pershing agreed that six divisions of American infantry and machine gunners per month would be left with Haig as long as the emergency existed. Pershing agreed to this on a predicated increase in tonnage, which would be utilised to bring over American troops in excess of the six divisions, which would then be used to complete American divisions.

Foch was not satisfied even with this, as it gave him only half the infantry and machine gunners which he was asking for, but Pershing's offer did go a long way toward meeting what the Supreme War Council had asked for. In view of the ultimate fact that the Germans were turned back in July, it might be called a satisfactory compromise, but at the time it did not please either Foch or Pershing.

Early in June, I was back in New York, charged by Balfour to urge the increase of American contingents, and through House this was successfully accomplished. Thus, close to one million men were sent over in four months, instead of the 480,000 which had been demanded at the time by the Supreme War Council.

It would be inaccurate to say that Pershing altered his attitude as a result of orders from Wilson. We do not know whether he modified his attitude as a result of word from Wilson, or the arguments of Allied Commanders, or further study of the situation on the spot. Tonnage was, of course, the crucial point. Its increase made possible at the time the creation of an American Army and the brigading of American troops with the British.

I shall probably be in London some time this year, and look forward to seeing you.

Yours ever

WILLIE WISEMAN

I come back again to my audience with King George V. When he had finished his talk with me, he showed me in very kindly fashion to the door and said to me, "Good-bye and good luck! and I shall hope to see you again. Remember everything depends upon the speed with which we can get American troops across."

## CHAPTER V

### *Communications between Sir William Wiseman and the Author*

As soon as I had completed the task of taking over from Drummond the London end of the Wiseman-Drummond "line", it was only natural that the new "line" should become busier than its predecessor. As I was now handling this end of it as a whole-time job, both Wiseman and House felt that a far closer and more continuous system of communication could be established which would not only allow them to put through their usual messages intended for Balfour, but would also enable them to put to me confidentially matters upon which they wanted advice and which I—after consultation with appropriate quarters in London—was able to give them. Conversely, I made it my duty to keep them closely and constantly in touch with what was going on in circles and ancient matters important to their work of keeping the President closely and intelligently advised. And with Reading also I rapidly established a confidential exchange of information which from the start he was good enough to say was of great use to him.

Wiseman arrived in London the third week of April 1918, and about a couple of weeks later went on to a Supreme War Council Meeting at Abbeville. During his stays in London prior to and after the Abbeville Meeting we had many consultations together. After his arrival back in the United States I received from him, under date June 7, the following letter :

Just a line to let you know that I am settling down comfortably.

I expect to have to do a lot of travelling here during the Summer because House is up at Magnolia on the North Shore, about an hour from Boston, and will stay there until the Autumn unless he goes to Europe in the meantime. My time has to be spent therefore between Boston, New York and Washington. I don't mind the travelling but find it is rather unsettling because while I am away from New York a number of relatively unimportant things accumulate which have to be attended to, and don't give me as much time as I should like for quietly thinking out some of the more important problems.



THE AUTHOR, WHEN ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHÉ TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, 1917-18



I am going to try and arrange for one of my ciphers at Washington so that you can cable direct to Reading if you like, or repeat to me, or let me repeat messages over the private telegraph wire in code. I shall cable you about this before you receive this letter.

The general war sentiment here could not be better. Reports from all over the country indicate the greatest enthusiasm. The U-boat sinkings off the coast here have only served to stimulate the war temper of the people. Of course the newspapers are making out that the American troops are the most important factor in the present battle, but I don't mind that because it increases their enthusiasm for the war.

Reading, I think, is looking tired ; the hot weather is having its effect on him, and, of course, he is working, as you know, rather too hard. The best solution would be—and one that would quite satisfy him—for him to return to England in July for a month or so. In this way he would escape the worst of the hot weather at Washington, get a holiday and a change, and feel that he was up to date and in touch with the situation again.

Both Reading and House were delighted when I told them of the arrangement you and I had made in London, and what you were doing for us. We all feel that the circle is now complete.

The activities of the "circle" to which Wiseman made reference in his foregoing letter soon commenced, and continued to operate in effective fashion. As an indication of some of the activities, I print certain letters which I have culled from amongst the many communications that passed between Wiseman and myself through the summer and into the autumn of 1918. In reproducing these letters it is necessary at the same time to emphasise that Wiseman's letters to me were intended by him to supplement and to elucidate the *official* communications which he sent through me to the Foreign Office. My letters to him speak for themselves in a similar sense. The letters which I have selected are as follows :

NEW YORK, July 4, 1918

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

I am writing this in rather a hurry tonight to catch tomorrow morning's mail. It is just to thank you ever so much

for your nice letter of 3rd June, and to acknowledge the reports you sent at the same time.

I had intended writing you some observations on these which had occurred to me while I read them, but I shall not have time to do so this evening, and for the last two weeks I have been either at the Embassy or with House in Magnolia. We have been, as you know, engaged almost exclusively on the question of intervention in Russia. I have not cabled you much about it because I have been with Reading, and have helped him draw up all his F.O. cables, so that I had practically nothing to add to them.

• Nor will I attempt to write to you at any length now because by the time this letter reaches you the situation will certainly have changed. I may say, however, that the President remains quite unconvinced by all the political arguments in favor of Allied intervention, nor was he more impressed by the military arguments in favor of re-creating an Eastern front. From the political point of view, he has always thought—and still thinks—it would be a great blunder for the Allies to intervene without an unmistakable invitation from the Soviet Government. Anyone who has studied his Mexican policy will understand the remarkable parallel which the Russian situation presents, and realise that this is to him more than a passing political question, but a matter of principle. I am not saying that he is right, but I think we should realise that we are up against a new conception of foreign policy which no amount of argument will reconcile with, for instance, traditional British policy. With regard to the military point of view, he is relying a good deal on the advice of his own military advisers, who are against any scheme on the ground that it will not lead to any effective pressure on the East and would divert our energies from the West. In this, of course, they are not considering the question of man-power so much as supplies and equipment.

The Czecho-Slovak position has, in my opinion, materially altered the situation, and will be, I think, the determining factor. The President recognises that both the Allies and the United States are responsible for the Czechs, and if possible must render them assistance. You may be sure that Reading is acting with great tact and firmness, and we are being helped by the much fuller information which we now receive from the F.O. by cable.

With regard to Reading, I want to tell you in great confidence

what he has in mind regarding his future plans. I will not repeat what I said in my letter of June 15th, which still holds good. My object is that you may be acquainted with the situation and have an opportunity of discussing it with Eric, and thinking it over, so that you have some suggestions to make when he arrives. Briefly the position is as follows :—Reading feels that he came out here not as ordinary Ambassador, or High Commissioner, but because he thought, owing to his close connection with the Cabinet at home and his friendship on this side with members of the Administration, that he would be able to gain the President's confidence to such an extent that he would be able to discuss with him and consult with him on important questions affecting the war. He has now come to the conclusion that it is quite impossible to break down the barrier between the President and the foreign representatives and that he is unable to do more than any ordinary Ambassador could accomplish. In this I think he is quite wrong, and I have told him so. In the first place, the President does trust him and values his opinion very highly, but it simply is not the President's nature to be communicative or to discuss affairs of state with anyone. In this respect Reading achieves far more than anyone else I can think of whom the Government could send out. Furthermore, Reading does not realise that the many problems (almost daily problems) which arise regarding finance, shipping, food, supplies, etc., which he negotiates and settles with comparative ease, would present real difficulties to anyone else, and furthermore would probably lead to friction. He has a particular gift for putting his case in a way that will appeal to the American officials and a very nice sense of how far he can go without causing trouble. He is worried, too, about the question of the Chief-Justiceship. He feels more and more that if he stays out here any longer he must resign his position, and, of course, that would be a terrible wrench for him, and in my humble opinion a sacrifice he ought not to be called upon to make. His present plan is to go home and put this position to the Prime Minister, and agree to come back again for a short time, say a month or six weeks, in order to clear up here and hand over to somebody else ; but I am afraid that his mind is very much against coming back here permanently. I have discussed the whole situation frankly with House, and more cautiously with the State Department. The opinion is unanimous that it would be a disaster to the Allied Cause if Reading

did not remain here until the war is over. I must say, however, that I think it is a pity for him to stay here too long without going home. He soon begins to feel out of touch (much more out of touch than he really is) and becomes restless and very anxious to have a full discussion of problems with the Cabinet at home.

I have suggested to him that the ideal arrangement would be something on the lines of Tardieu's new appointment ; that is to say, a member of the Cabinet, without portfolio, specially charged with all American affairs ; and that he should divide his time between London and Washington. I feel certain the best results could be achieved in this way. I think it would be advisable to have a good permanent head of the Missions, but as far as the Embassy is concerned I would leave that in charge of Barclay while Reading is away. Frankly, I dread the idea of a new Ambassador who would not know the position here and the very peculiar way in which business is done.

I have written freely exactly what I think, and would be glad if you would show this to Eric and tell him it represents also the view of Col. House.

Reading wants me to remain here while he is in London, and, although I shall be very disappointed not to go with him and see you all, I can understand that it may be of use for him to be in close touch by cable with House and others through me.

With very best wishes,

Yours ever,

W. WISEMAN

LONDON, July 16, 1918

MY DEAR WILLIE,

Many thanks for your letter of the 4th July, which is of great interest. I am afraid you must be having a hard time travelling about between the Embassy, New York and Magnolia, especially during the hot weather.

I have conveyed to you in my cables the very great stress laid by the Government on the importance of Allied intervention in Russia. Unquestionably, you and Reading have had a very hard task to bring the President round to his present way of thinking. Personally, I felt with you that the chief thing was to make a start, and that once American troops were landed at Vladivostok, matters might develop in a way that would be satisfactory to all concerned. I am inclined to think on the whole that in the end

the cautious policy of the President may turn out to be the wisest and best. History alone can decide whether a large force composed chiefly of Japanese as was suggested would not have had the effect that the President forecasted. In any case, it seems to me that a bridge now having been built, we can only hope that Allied assistance will take a favourable course.

I have telegraphed you regarding my conversation with Milner. I was glad to find him very fully alive to the value of my confidential exchange of views with you, and this channel may prove to be of even greater assistance in the future. He is very anxious indeed that no time should be lost in conveying the expedition to Vladivostok, in order that its initial preparations in Siberia may be completed before the winter sets in. No-one, of course, has any formed idea as to what particular course events in those regions will take. All that it is hoped at present is that assistance to the Czechs will enable the railway line to be firmly held, and will rally the anti-Bolshevist elements in Russia to the allied standards. Lockhart has lately been insisting in his telegrams that the delay in sending an allied expedition has thrown many elements in Russia that might have been with us into the arms of Germany. He instances especially the case of Miliukov, who, he says, was quite ready to work with us, but in despair has now gone over to the enemy. Personally, I never had very much faith in the argument that it would be possible to re-create an eastern front. It is quite true that there may be many Russians who are anti-German, and who would like, if possible, to oust Germans from their country, but on the other hand I cannot really believe that any sufficient number are anxious to re-create such an army as would alone achieve the objects that some of our most ardent interventionists have in view. These, however, are speculations, and the main thing at the moment is to get on with the policy that has recently been agreed upon.

Thank you very much for giving me your personal views regarding Reading and his future plans. You can rely upon me to treat these with all the necessary confidence. Eric has been out of London for a few days, but as soon as he returns I will show him your letter and talk the matter over with him. I can quite understand Reading's feelings in regard to his relationship with the President. Quite apart from the President's nature and personality, my feeling is that he is probably doing the right thing in not taking Reading into his confidence to the extent

and in the manner the latter would like. It would inevitably arouse jealousy in the breasts of other Ambassadors, and in the end might do more harm than good to the common cause. I entirely agree with you, and I feel quite sure that Eric and everyone else in authority here would hold the same view, that it would be a national, indeed an allied disaster if Reading were to give up his post. The arrangement which you have suggested to him seems to me to be an excellent one, and I am very glad that you have told me of it beforehand. Personally, I feel that the Government, and more particularly Lloyd George, would do anything they could to keep him in his present appointment. So, if your plan has found favour in his eyes, I do not think there should be any difficulty in bringing it to fruition. I entirely agree with you that while Reading is away from Washington the Embassy should be left in charge of Barclay, and with my special knowledge of the Embassy and the way in which business is done, I should certainly bear out this idea by laying great stress upon its importance in any conversation that I may have.

I have just had a wire from Frazier to say that he is crossing from Paris to-night to see me ; I do not know what this portends !

The German offensive started yesterday, but I do not think that the first results can be said to be satisfactory to the enemy. The position, however, will have changed considerably one way or the other before this letter reaches you, and it is useless, therefore, to dilate upon it.

To return for one moment to the Russian question. A telegram came through last night from Reading to the Prime Minister in which the former suggested that a labour or socialist delegation headed by some prominent labour leader should be sent with the allied forces. I discussed this question with Philip Kerr.<sup>1</sup> The idea seems to me to be a very good one *au fond*, but a very delicate one to handle and to carry out. In any case, it seems to me that the labour delegation, should it be sent, ought in some way to be bound up with the political mission of which I have made mention to you in telegrams, and should not stand entirely on its own. The real difficulty that I see in the idea is in the selection of the delegation, and more particularly of its leader. If the latter is chosen from the Henderson group, Appleton, O'Grady, Will Thorne, Havelock Wilson, etc. would

<sup>1</sup> Later Marquis of Lothian, Lloyd George's "right-hand" Private Secretary in the "Garden Suburb".

probably be up in arms at once. On the other hand, it would not be possible to make the selection from amongst the last mentioned persons. It may be that the best way out would be to leave it to the executive of the British Labour Party to make the choice, but in whatever way it is done, I think it unlikely that there will not be recriminations upon one side or the other.

So much for the present. I do not think there is anything else of interest that I can tell you, but I will write you again next week.

I hope you will not overwork yourself, and that you are keeping fit. I am very sorry on personal grounds that you are not to return with Reading, but I feel sure that on public grounds, while he is over here, you ought certainly to be in America.

With very best wishes,

Yours ever,

ARTHUR MURRAY

On July 25, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

Since writing to you last week, I have had a talk with Eric on the future position and plans of Reading. He is inclined to think that Reading may be induced to go back on the old conditions, but if the latter does not wish to do so, then of course every effort must be made to find a *modus vivendi*. He is fully alive to the exceptional importance of keeping Reading in some position or other at the head of the Washington machine, and he also inclines to your opinion that if the idea outlined by you were adopted, it would not be wise (if it could be avoided) to have a new Ambassador at Washington. One of the main reasons against the adoption of your idea is that too much time would be spent travelling to and fro, and that both from the point of view of work and the tiring journeys entailed upon Reading, there would be great drawbacks in this respect. I suggested to Eric that this might be overcome by the "fast battle cruiser" idea which has been mooted from time to time. He was disposed to think, however, that even the week's journey in those circumstances was rather too long. On this point, I do think that the time has come when a definite move should be made to put the battle cruiser idea into operation. I mentioned it to Frazier when last I saw him, (not, of course, in connection

with Reading) and he was of the opinion that it ought to be carried out.

In regard to the question of the Lord Chief-Justiceship, Eric thinks there is a very complete answer to put to Reading. The matter resolves itself into this ; if Reading resigns his ambassadorship, then obviously the London-Washington machine will suffer ; if he does not do so, then to a certain extent the administration of the law suffers. Which, however, in a time of war is most important ? Surely it is better that the latter should suffer instead of the former. If it were put in this way to the Judges and the Bar, I do not think there can be any doubt as to what their verdict would be.

Eric has shown your letter very confidentially to A. J. B., who will turn the matter over in his mind pending Reading's arrival ; he will say nothing to anyone else. I propose to meet Reading on his arrival at Liverpool, and on our journey to London I shall have the opportunity of talking over the whole matter with him.

The news from France during the last ten days has been very cheering, but it is yet too early to say whether the Germans intend to hold on to the " Pocket " to the bitter end, or whether they will retire behind the Vesle and the Aisne.

One or two points in regard to home politics which may interest you. There has been some talk lately regarding the possibility of a General Election. Personally, I feel that we are bound to have one either towards the end of this year or the beginning of next. The life of this Parliament has been extended again to January, but I do not think that any further extension beyond that will take place. If that is the general view then it is merely a matter of convenience as to whether the election should take place in November or in January. Some people say, why have a General Election when there is nothing to fight about ? A few months hence, however, it is not impossible that a German peace offensive might provide an issue around which a struggle would take place.

The Munitions strike, which we thought might be ended a few days ago, has, unfortunately, developed in a somewhat serious manner. I propose by next bag to send you a few observations on labour unrest in Britain, and, at the same time, to enter into the position in which Arthur Henderson finds himself vis-à-vis the alleged and " encouraging " replies of enemy socialists.

It may interest you to know that all the arrangements for our share in the Siberian expedition are in the hands of Walter Long ; the reason for this is that our activities in that quarter must chiefly emanate from and be organised in Canada.

On August 5, 1918, Wiseman wrote to me :

A very interesting mail has arrived from you dated July 22nd. A. J. B.'s memorandum to the War Cabinet and the other documents you send are of the greatest interest and help to me in keeping me up to date with what is passing in England.

At the end of this week I am going up to stay with House at Magnolia for a week or so. I shall take my holiday up there and hope to get a certain amount of tennis and bathing, but I shall have the most valuable opportunity of discussion with him and also by telephone will be in close touch with the State Department and New York. Your memoranda and letters—which give me such an admirable outline of the trend of opinion at home—will be most useful to me to bear in mind when talking to him.

Reading should be landing tomorrow, and I hope you will write me fully regarding his impressions because I do not suppose that he will have time to write to me, and you will, of course, be in very close touch with him.

Regarding affairs here, you will have noticed that the draft age has been extended ; and there is every evidence of still more activity and enthusiasm for the war. I think you can safely take it that America is in no mood to talk peace just now. Of course, if the Allies want to consider a German peace proposal America will be obliged to consider it as well ; but you will find that there is no danger of pacifism or premature peace-making in this country.

With regard to Siberia, I take the position to be that the Allies are accepting the President's proposals not because they particularly like them, but because they think they are the thin-end of the wedge and that the President's scheme will develop with events. In this I think the Allies are perfectly right, but it is not a point-of-view which they should insist upon in communications with U.S.G. The present policy of U.S.G. is to help the Czecho-Slovaks from immediate danger of being cut to pieces. Beyond that their policy does not go any further in a military

sense. Of course, there is the scheme of the economic commission, and that has unlimited possibilities, but it would be dangerous if the U.S.G. got the idea that the Allies were going to use the Czecho-Slovaks as a lever to force the President into military intervention on a large scale.

MAGNOLIA, MASSACHUSETTS

September 4, 1918

DEAR COLONEL MURRAY,

The letters, cables and documents you have been sending Sir William have been of the greatest value and I want you to know of my warm appreciation.

It is only through such complete information as you give that one can correctly advise those on this side.

I hope you will come over here soon so as to keep in touch with both countries.

Sincerely yours,

E. M. HOUSH

1st October, 1918

DEAR COLONEL HOUSH,

Thank you very much for your letter of September 4th, which I was very pleased to receive.

I am so glad to feel that I have been able to be of some assistance to you, and to help in a small way to keep in being a close touch between the two countries. The fact that the work I am doing has these two ends in view makes it at all times of a most congenial nature.

I should be very glad to come across if opportunity offers so as to keep in touch with both countries.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR MURRAY

On August 8, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

I went up to Liverpool to meet Reading and brought him back to London. He had had a good rest during the voyage and seemed to me to be very fit and reasonably cheery. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed for me to give you any impression regarding the probable effect of his visit. He has seen the Prime Minister twice, but has not yet had a talk with Balfour.



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Arthur Murray, with the business agent of the House  
Paris, March 29, 1919.

COLONEL HOUSE



I had a long talk with him on the way down from Liverpool and yesterday morning regarding his own personal position : (after the receipt of your letter on the subject I had had a conversation about it with Eric). Reading seemed to have quite made up his mind that the present state of affairs could not go on indefinitely. He insisted that the Chief Justiceship was more important than some people seemed to realise, and that if he was to continue as Ambassador, spending his whole time in Washington, it would really be necessary for him to give up his legal appointment. If he were to do so, he would, of course, be left without any position after the war. The fact that he was in the House of Lords would preclude him from going back to the Bar, and unless he were to take up an Ambassadorial career, he would have nothing left to do. After some conversation on these lines I said that it seemed to me that the only way out was some sort of combination between the two—something, in short, that would enable him, whilst controlling the British-American machine, to give a certain amount of time to the Chief Justiceship. This gave him his opportunity, and he said that this solution had been already discussed between himself and you, and that House was in agreement with it. I suggested that a further good reason for this arrangement would be that his presence over here would help to control the Prime Minister at times when any really difficult problem arose as between the President and this Government. This is, of course, not a reason that either he or I could put to the people over here, but you will of course realise it is important. Milner said to me the other day that the one danger in the situation that he foresaw was that some time or another there might be a personal disagreement in essentials between the President and Lloyd George. It is such a pity that the latter does not on occasions take more trouble to state accurately the result of negotiations which have taken place. I take, for instance, the speech he made in the House yesterday. In the course of that speech he stated " soon after the blow of March 21st, the British Government made a special appeal to President Wilson to send men over even if they were not formed in divisions so that they could be brigaded in British and French formations ". Those of us in the know are well aware of the fact that the appeal was made, and responded to by the President, long before the March offensive took place. I have always emphasised this aspect of the case in conversation. People are so inclined to say that the

drafting of American troops as reinforcements into the French and British armies was necessary owing to the German attack in March. When that has been said to me I have always pointed out that the President's decision was taken long before the offensive commenced, and that its generous nature was very considerably magnified by that fact. It really is distressing that the Prime Minister in a speech in the House of Commons should utter words which have the appearance of whittling down the decision which the United States took in this case. I do hope that the paragraph in the speech will escape the President's attention !

While I am on the speech, there is one other comment that I should like to make. In referring to the position prior to the German attack the Prime Minister said : " Considerable American forces had been expected by the Spring, but as a matter of fact, on March 21st there was only one American division in the line ". He has really no justification for saying that considerable American forces had been expected by the Spring. This is as much as to say that considerable forces were promised but that he was not kept aware of the fact that the original expectations would not be fulfilled. What is quite clear is that from all the figures that were being sent from Washington to London and to France during last winter, the authorities over here must have been in the closest touch with the progress of the American programme, and ought certainly not to have allowed themselves to think that the original " 24 divisions " expectations were likely to be fulfilled. I mention these points as accentuating the good that would be derived were Reading in a position at this end to control in some manner the authoritative utterances which might possibly give grounds for disagreement and discord.

As soon as I gather anything further regarding Reading's future position, I will at once let you know. I am so glad I suggested to him that he could make any terms that he liked, and in conversation yesterday evening with Eric the latter, who does not like the suggested arrangement, said : " Of course, if it comes to the point, his value is so great that he would be able probably to dictate his own conditions ".

There is only one other matter at the moment which may be of interest to you, and that is regarding the next Supreme War Council. I send you for your confidential information the following telegram that has been sent by the Prime Minister to Signor Orlando to-day :

The most important business before the Allies is, I think, the consideration of Secretary Baker's statement that the Americans cannot carry out the 100 divisions programme for next year and that they cannot provide even for their reduced programme of 80 divisions unless cargo steamers are furnished from non-American sources. It seems to me that unless something can be done at once to put this right, there will be no such allied superiority in France next year as will enable us to attack the enemy with a chance of decisive success. In these circumstances, I suggest that the whole question should be thoroughly investigated at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council, and that this next meeting should be held in London, because most of the information as regards shipping and the Admiralty convoy is concentrated here. If we are to come to decisions, it is essential that we should have the experts and their information immediately available. We should be glad to arrange for the meeting to be held at any date which may suit you and M. Clemenceau. I am sending a similar message to the latter.

In a letter last week I said that I would write to you fully on the question of Imperial Preference. The subject was referred to in the House of Lords yesterday evening, and I will therefore defer it to a future letter.

On August 20, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

Just a few lines before the bag goes. Reading has to-day sent a telegram to you on the subject of the situation in Siberia. He has given very careful thought to its composition with a view to impressing upon you the serious aspect in which the situation is viewed over here. The serious thing, of course, is that the autumn is drawing on, and every week adds to the difficulties with which the relieving forces will be beset owing to the severe winter conditions in that part of the world. I have personal knowledge of those conditions, having travelled through that country some sixteen years ago at the conclusion of the Boxer campaign in China in which I served. I wonder if it is really the case that the assistance in the matter of supplies and so on that would have to be given were two or three extra Japanese Divisions despatched eastwards would actually in the long run detract from the American military effort on the Western Front. If the

considerations that have been given to this aspect of the matter are full and complete enough to prove that this would be so, speaking for myself, I should say that the situation which has arisen in Siberia is such that the whole matter ought to be reviewed in the light of latest developments.

Reading is still very busy, in my opinion much too busy as he is getting no rest at all. He attends all the meetings of the War Cabinet. This in itself is, of course, a good thing because it helps to take him out of and to put him on a higher plane than the ordinary run of Ambassadors. He spends the rest of his time seeing various members of the Cabinet individually and many other people, British and American, on important affairs. In addition, he has had unloaded on to him (unfairly in my opinion) an enquiry into the whole problem of shipping and tonnage. This is really not his legitimate work and it should not have been put upon him. I have suggested to him that he should obtain the services of a good "second" of such a calibre as to relieve him of most of the work, and to preside at meetings at which he himself is not able to be present. I hope he may be able to work out something of this nature. In the meantime he is looking and feeling somewhat tired, and I am pressing him hard to take his week-ends off and to go out of town.

The controversy around the subject of a General Election is waxing more furious as the days go by. I think I have always explained to you that the officials of both parties, Liberal and Unionist, are averse to an Election, the former because they feel that they would have to "toe the line" behind Lloyd George and the latter because they think it would make Lloyd George much too powerful. Arthur Henderson, who for a long time urged that a General Election in the autumn was necessary, has now publicly declared that he does not consider it to be so. Northcliffe is putting in all the driving powers of his Press to endeavour to bring about an Election. Lloyd George himself is in favour of an Election. If he advises a Dissolution and has to form a new Government we may be quite sure that not a few of the members of the present administration will disappear and will give place to men younger in body and mind and more willing to admit that past controversies must be viewed in the light of subsequent developments, and indeed that "the old order is changing and giving place to the new". I am not sure that these are not some of the thoughts that are uppermost in Lloyd

George's mind when thinking out the pros and cons of an Election this year.

On August 23, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

Eric tells me that he has become aware of the fact that Hooker, Franklin Roosevelt, Cravath and some other distinguished Americans who have been over here are imbued with the idea that the Labour situation in this country vis-à-vis the war is very serious. This is, of course, not the case, but if possible we should like to have some idea as to the sources of information of these gentlemen, and where and how they gathered these impressions.

In my several letters to you on the subject, you will remember that I examined pretty closely the differences of opinion on the war and on a negotiated peace that exist in the ranks of the Labour Party, but from those letters you certainly will not have gathered the impression that the Labour situation generally in Great Britain is "serious". That there has been unrest goes without saying, and I examined the causes of the unrest somewhat fully in my letter to you of July 30th. You will remember, however, that towards the end of that letter I said that it would be strange had the industrial revolution that has taken place during the war been unaccompanied by friction and unsettlement, but that despite several causes for just complaint on the part of the State, it might be said that Labour had "delivered the goods" and in the bulk had played its part in the great struggle not unworthily.

The meetings of the Trades Union Congress on Sept. 2nd and of the inter-Allied Labour Conference on 16th, 17th and 18th September will throw more light on the Labour situation generally, particularly with regard to its attitude to the fundamental issues of the war. The controversy arising out of the recent Henderson-Troelstra incident will undoubtedly come to a head at the above-mentioned meetings.

In the meantime, I should be grateful if you could possibly throw any light in due course on the question referred to in the early paragraphs of this letter.

On August 30, 1918, Wiseman wrote to me :

It has occurred to me that you might be interested to have some description of the week I spent at Magnolia with the

President and Col. House. The mail is just going, but I will do my best to give you some description—though I fear it will be disjointed.

I had arranged to spend a week with Col. House particularly because Gordon Auchincloss, his son-in-law (whom you will remember is assistant counsellor of the State Department), was taking his holiday there at the same time and we had planned some golf and tennis. The morning after I arrived, however, the President and his party reached Magnolia. They had come quite unexpectedly, having only decided upon the trip the day before.

I did my best to keep my name out of the papers and the reporters were very good about it and I think only one or two papers mentioned the fact that I was there.

This was sufficient, however, for the French Embassy to ring me up on the long distance telephone and ask if there had been any special significance in the conferences between the President, House and myself. I said they had been of the utmost importance since we had proved that the President could put at least 50 yards on his iron shots if he would only follow through. In fact it was a most interesting time for me. The President, Mrs. Wilson, and Admiral Grayson, his physician and Naval aide-de-camp, occupied a beautiful colonial house overlooking the sea and about a couple of hundred yards from Col. House's bungalow, where I was staying. A company of marines kept the public at a most respectful distance and a destroyer lying off the point guarded him from ambitious U-boat commanders. The President said he was delighted to find me there and insisted on my remaining with the party. Early in the morning, about eight o'clock, he would motor to one of the nearby golf courses and play a round before the course was crowded. He usually played with Grayson, and Mrs. Wilson went nine holes with them.

On one occasion at Myopia the Club boor came up to him at the first tee, introduced himself, and offered to play a round with the President and show him the course. With the coldest look I have ever seen, the President turned to him and said, "Thank you, I have a caddy". Out of ear-shot I asked him who his friend was, "Oh, just a Boston ass", was the President's reply.

As a rule the President and Mrs. Wilson came to lunch at

the Houses' bungalow and we all went over to dine with the President in the evening. In the afternoons they generally went for a motor drive through the really beautiful country along the North Shore. Of course I never discussed any of the questions of the moment unless the President raised the subject, but on one or two occasions the President himself suggested that after lunch he and I and Col. House should retire and talk business. In particular we discussed the League of Nations, the economic policy of the Allies, the President's Mexican policy and the possibilities of German peace efforts. I have, as you know, cabled Reading the substance of these conversations and I will try and elaborate on them in memoranda which, however, I am afraid will not be ready for this mail.

We talked a good deal of politics in England. The President knows England much better than I supposed. Apparently, when he was at Princeton, he used to spend his summer vacations bicycling or walking through England, particularly the Lake districts, and at that time had quite a wide acquaintance among University men in England and Scotland. He thinks it was a mistake for us to have a Coalition Government, on the ground that the mass of the people would suspect that the Government was controlled by the more reactionary elements and the representatives of capital and privilege. He is, I am afraid, a pretty extreme radical with that curious uninformed prejudice against the so-called governing class in England. I think he would prefer the Lloyd George of Limehouse rather than of the Guildhall. He does not seem to know much of the details of continental politics and I am much impressed with the way in which he relies upon House's advice in these matters.

He does not seem to have much sympathy for Italy and thinks she entered the war as a cold-blooded business transaction. Nor has he (himself) very strong feelings about Alsace-Lorraine, although he says that American opinion is very determined on this point; that they will pay their debt to France by giving her back Alsace-Lorraine. He has no sympathy whatever for Bulgaria or Turkey. He is convinced that there are genuine liberal elements in Austria and even in Germany who sincerely wish to follow democratic ideals, but admits that they are too small a minority to have any influence at present on the peoples, as a whole. The German people, he believes, must be made to hate war, to realise that no military machine can dominate the world

today. His personal hatred of the Kaiser, whom he has never seen, is almost amusing. The elected autocrat can see no good in the hereditary tyrant. Talking of the Crown Prince he said it made him furious to think the destinies of Germany might one day be in the hands of "that young ass" !

I was struck by his talking one day at some length on the question of Anti-British feeling in America. He ascribes it, of course, chiefly to the Irish. He does not believe in propaganda as a means of bringing the two countries closer together but thinks that the war will do much to help us understand each other better and that afterwards we shall gradually be drawn closer as we work together for the same ideals.


I find the President very interested in personalities. He was anxious to hear about our leading men, their characteristics and mode of life. He has interesting and novel ideas about the writing of history, which is one of his favorite occupations. He misses, he says, the college life and the pleasant association with his fellow professors.

I must close this letter now to catch tonight's mail. It has been, as I feared, very rambling. Is there any chance of your coming back with Reading? If not, I think I shall try and get over for a short trip as soon as Reading returns.

With very best wishes, and please continue to write and send me all the news you can.

On September 9, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

We returned from Paris yesterday where we had an interesting if somewhat strenuous time. We were staying at the Embassy with Lord Derby. I sent you a telegram to-day giving you very briefly an account of our visit. Reading saw everyone of importance whom it was necessary for him to see. Clemenceau he saw twice, merely in order to discuss with him the question of British man-power for next year's campaign. The French have for some time past hinted that our man-power was not being made available up to its maximum limit. Memoranda on the question were therefore prepared and submitted for the consideration of the French Government. The situation was rapidly, it seems to me, developing into one in which France would attempt to dictate to us how our man-power should be used. Reading was commissioned by the Prime Minister to



PRESIDENT WILSON



discuss the whole matter with Clemenceau. Previous to seeing Clemenceau, he talked with Tardieu, who is more and more becoming one of Clemenceau's right-hand men and a growing power in official Government circles in Paris. Tardieu suggested to Reading that the latter and himself should be appointed by their respective Governments to go into the whole question of British man-power and to decide what should be done. Reading headed this off by saying that if this course were adopted a very difficult situation might develop. He thought it much better, therefore, that the two Governments should agree that Great Britain, realising the seriousness of the situation, would do all that she possibly could to put the maximum number of men into the field by April 1st next year. Tardieu expressed himself in agreement with this view. Subsequently Reading had a conversation with Clemenceau and took the same line as in his talk with Tardieu. Clemenceau agreed that on the whole the course suggested by Reading would be the best course to adopt, although he said that he might still have to make an official request in the matter. Unquestionably Reading succeeded in thus ending satisfactorily a very unsatisfactory situation, and credit is due to him for the manner in which he handled it. At the same time I would observe that the situation ought never to have been allowed to develop in the way that it did. Seeing that we have been and are keeping France's head above water in so many different ways, it is difficult to see why the proposition that we should in any way allow her to dictate to us on the man-power question should have been countenanced for a single moment.

I did not myself see Clemenceau, but Reading told me that he found him in good fettle and in high spirits. Derby told me that Clemenceau took him out a couple of weeks ago at half-past five in the morning to visit the battle front. They spent the whole day driving about, coming back to Paris at eight o'clock in the evening. "By that time", said Derby, "I was dog-tired, but the old man stepped out of the car as fresh as a daisy, and after having something to eat proceeded to work until close on midnight."

The same activity of mind and body applies also to Foch. During the latter's conversation with Reading, he frequently expressed himself as very greatly satisfied with the way in which the battle was going. He expressed himself as confident of finishing the war next year so long as it was found possible for the

Allics and America to put the necessary number of divisions into the field, and in this connection he laid particular stress upon the question of British man-power. He also referred to a matter concerning which there are undoubtedly in high quarters differences of opinion which may perhaps develop and grow. These differences centre round the question of man-power in so far as it is apportioned, on the one hand to infantry and on the other to aeroplanes and tanks. The first school of thought hold that aircraft and tanks are auxiliary weapons only, and that their interests so far as personnel is concerned should be subordinated entirely to the infantry requirements. The second school look upon these two arms as weapons of a much more than auxiliary nature, and hold the view that the available man-power should be used, firstly, for the purpose of maintaining what they consider to be the required number of aeroplanes and tanks, and that the infantry should have the men that are left. The question, of course, bristles with difficulties, and we may have by no means heard the last of it. I am not sure myself, however, that like so many other difficulties, it will not solve itself, although there may be some controversy before it does so.

We were unable, unfortunately for lack of time, to visit Pershing's headquarters at Chaumont, but we motored one day to see the 32nd American division, which was in the line near Juvigny. On the way we lunched with General Mangin, commanding the 10th French army. We found him very cheerful and highly pleased with the progress that his troops were making. In Paris they call him "the butcher", a name handed down from the days of the "Nivelle" offensive in April 1917, when, according to some of the deputies who went to the front, he allowed his men to be slaughtered by the thousand in useless attacks. I should be inclined to say of him that if he thought it necessary to take a position as part of a general tactical scheme, he would do so at all costs on the grounds that by breaking off the operation and beginning again on a subsequent day, he would probably lose more men in the long run than by carrying it through immediately. He gave one the impression of a wolf who would not leave hold of his prey once he had tackled it, and indeed this very aptly describes the manner in which he is at present carrying on his operations west of the Chemin des Dames. Arthur Glasgow, with whom I had been lunching in Paris the previous day, had told me that he had seen Mangin at

the latter's headquarters a few days before. In the course of conversation Glasgow pulled out of his pocket a rabbit's foot and gave it to Mangin "for luck". At lunch I told Mangin that I had seen Glasgow on the previous day, and that he had informed me of the incident of the rabbit's foot. Whereupon the General pulled out of his pocket a key chain to the end of which was attached the rabbit's foot. "Here it is", he said. "I always have it with me, it is my constant companion, and it is helping me to win my battles and to end the war." During lunch someone asked Reading what were American thoughts in regard to peace and what peace terms she would impose. Reading replied instantly: "America is not thinking of peace, she wants to get on with the war, and she will not think of peace terms until she has obtained victory". This remark pleased the General tremendously. "Bien," he said, "that is the way to talk. Why discuss peace when there is no peace, it is talk of peace before victory is gained that undermines the resolution of the peoples." Mangin referred in eloquent terms to the American division which was fighting under his command, so indeed did all his staff. One and all said that it was not possible to imagine anything finer than the way in which the Americans had been fighting. After lunch we motored on up to what used to be a village called Tartier, but which has long since disappeared, if not from the map, at any rate from the face of the earth! Here in an immense dug-out, a series of caves in the side of a hill, we found General Hahn and his Divisional Staff awaiting us. After a talk with the General, the latter summoned around us his brigade commanders and the officers of his Staff, and Reading addressed them in a speech which gave great satisfaction. This speech was subsequently embodied in divisional orders and read to all the troops, and as you are aware, was telegraphed out to America. On emerging from the dug-out, we were confronted by the ubiquitous cinematograph operator, who proceeded to turn his wheel as we performed the graceful act of bidding farewell and entering our car. It may even be that you will see our invigorating performance depicted on the screen of cinema houses in the United States!

Prior to going up to the Front, Reading had seen Pershing in Paris. He had an interesting conversation with him which turned mainly on the question of shipping. Pershing emphasised the fact that he was drawing more and more upon his reserve of

supplies, and that it was essential that Great Britain should provide more shipping immediately. The shipping problem is, of course, a very serious one. There appears to have grown up a feeling amongst the Americans and the French that we can produce ships out of our waistcoat pockets whenever they are needed. This may be due to the fact that when the great necessity arose in March last for a great increase in the number of ships to transport the American troops to England, the British Ministry of Shipping somehow or other provided many more ships than they had previously considered it was possible to do. Our friends now think that the operation can be repeated in the same way at any time. This, however, is not the case. We have cut ourselves down almost to the bone in regard to exports and imports of supplies other than those required for the war, and so far as one can see it is not possible to go very much further in this direction. The question, therefore, it seems to me, is bound to arise as to the extent that America has cut down on unnecessary overseas trade, and what extra amount of tonnage she could put into the pool were she really to tackle the problem in the way that we have done. These matters will present themselves to the Enquiry which Reading is now holding into the shipping problem. It is fortunate in this connection that Baker is coming here, as it will be possible to talk the question over with a member of the Administration in a way which could not be done with any other American official on this side of the Atlantic.

Reading saw Tardieu on several occasions in Paris, and also had long talks with Stettinius. While we were at the Embassy the Prince of Wales, who was on his way back to London from Italy, came in one night after dinner. He had much to say for himself, and displayed a lively knowledge of men and affairs, and a keen sense of humour. On the other hand, he has an extraordinary shyness which, on this occasion, produced a somewhat awkward situation. Reading had gone out to dinner, and Derby and his brother-in-law, Lord Charles Montagu, and Stettinius and I were at dinner alone. It was during dinner that a message was handed to Derby from the Chancery to say that the Prince was passing through Paris from the Italian Front where he had been for a week or two, and would look in after dinner. When dinner was over we went out on to the big verandah which overlooks the Embassy garden to have our coffee and cigars. At about half-past nine the Prince turned up. As I

have said, he had quite a lot to say for himself, and gave us a very interesting and sometimes amusing account of affairs on the Italian Front. Conversation then turned to what was going on in France and on the French Front, and the hour of midnight began to approach. The Prince quite clearly wanted to get away and everybody else equally clearly wanted him to go in order that they might retire to bed. But he sat in his chair seemingly unable to tear himself out of it ! The conversation would lapse into nothingness ; there would be a minute's or more silence and then someone would start it up again ! And the amusing though somewhat awkward position was that everybody knew just what was happening, namely, that this curious and unaccountable shyness which sometimes came over the Prince prevented him from getting up and saying, " I am off to bed ". So far as the Britishers in the party were concerned they could do nothing. They had to sit and wait until the heir to the Throne arose and announced his departure ! But, thanks to the presence of Derby's distinguished American guest, the situation was at last saved. Unable to stand it any longer, Stettinius rose to his feet and said, " If you will forgive me, your Royal Highness, I am going to bed ". With a sigh of relief came from the Prince, " Yes, just about time too, and I'll do the same ". As his and Stettinius's cars sped away into the night, I turned to Derby and said, " Thank God for a great American citizen ".

In regard to the political situation in France, Clemenceau's position is, of course, at the moment very strong indeed, and the bulk of France appears to be gathered round him. It is always well, however, to look ahead in these matters, and to endeavour so far as possible to forecast the future, if only with a view to being prepared to meet unexpected eventualities. I asked a French friend of mine, who is in close touch with the French political situation, whether he saw any dangers or rocks ahead. He replied that the situation at the moment was eminently satisfactory, but that if Germany were to decide to sacrifice her aspirations in the west, in order to gamble on what she could get out of the east, and to offer not only to evacuate Belgium and Northern France but also to discuss the question of Alsace-Lorraine, he feared that this might be a very tempting bait to a considerable portion of the French population. The reason for his fear, he continued, was that many people in France had been

led to believe and had made themselves think that Alsace-Lorraine was the one question for which in the main they were fighting, and if their ambitions in this respect were in some way fulfilled, they would think that there was no reason for going on with the war. I asked him in what way other than by word of mouth they could show their disapproval of a Government which wished to continue the war even in the face of peace offers of this nature. He replied that large bodies of workmen might be induced by the Socialist leaders to adopt a "down tools" policy. "There has not been", he said, "a sufficient education of the people generally of the real aims for which we are fighting"; and although he is a strong supporter of Clemenceau and of the Allies' War policy, he felt that Clemenceau might possibly mishandle labour if really difficult times arose. I pass on to you these observations of my friend for what they are worth. For myself, while not wishing to paint the picture in too dark colours, I feel that in the next few months very difficult questions will have to be faced vis-à-vis German peace offers and labour both in France and in this country, and we should not be unprepared for them.

As I said to you in my telegram of yesterday, the result of the Trade Union Congress at Derby was, on the whole, good. John Frey, of the American Labour Mission, has just been to see me and has given me some of his impressions concerning it. I will not, however, touch upon this matter now, as the really important labour meeting is the inter-Allied Labour Conference which is to be held next Monday, and I will therefore defer any comments I may have to make until after that has taken place. I am seeing Frey again this week and also Gompers.

So much for the present. Hoping you are fit.

On September 12, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

Very many thanks for your letter of 30th August. I am so glad that you have found my letters to you of interest and of use. I am very glad to hear Colonel House's views on the general Labour situation in France and in England. In the main I agree with those views. At the same time, I cannot conceal from myself that what seem to me to be difficult times lie ahead. Very strenuous efforts will be made by the Germans during the coming winter to play upon pacifist and semi-pacifist elements in

European allied countries. Owing to the very serious shortage of coal the winter will be a very cold one for very many people, and though I firmly believe that we shall "weather the storm" I think, as I have previously said, that we should be in every way prepared to meet it. Nothing can help more to this end than complete and friendly and intimate understanding and relationship between the various Governments and individual ministers of the Allies, and it is for this reason that one is so perturbed by various evidence that comes to light of "rifts in the lute". The latter has already formed the subject of telegrams between Reading and yourself. I made it my business whilst in Paris to find out quietly from some of my French friends what were the views and thoughts of the French Government about its Allies. I found that from Clemenceau downwards they were all extremely irritated with the President, chiefly, of course, in respect of his attitude on the Siberian question. This feeling will doubtless right itself, and seeing what America has done and is doing for France there is, of course, no good reason for it ever to have existed. But we have to take things as they are, and the fact that it does exist shows how necessary it is to do everything possible to maintain the good feeling and the intimate contact that is above all things necessary at times like these.

With regard to the British Government, I may tell you that Clemenceau is not particularly sympathetic (except of course outwardly) to Lloyd George. Here again we have a situation which ought not to exist. I do wish these great and distinguished people who have in their hands to play with the destinies of nations and indeed of the whole world, would endeavour to eliminate altogether from their minds the personal equation, and sink everything else but the main and supreme object of pulling and holding together so long as our war aims remain unfulfilled.

On September 14, 1918, Wiseman wrote to me :

I have so many letters from you unanswered that I feel ashamed of myself. You must, however, make excuses for me. For the last month I have been up on the North Shore with House and have been trying to keep my work going under rather difficult conditions. It has been well worth the time spent because I saw so much of House and the President and had an opportunity of getting at their inner minds on important

questions. I think I was also able to establish an even closer relation with them than before.

I have now returned to New York, but find a pile of work to get through. Practically the arrears of a month.

I have not been down to Washington at all since Reading left and feel that I ought to go there as soon as possible and exchange news with Barclay. Otherwise I am afraid he may feel that I am purposely keeping away from him. I hope that you will not revenge yourself by writing any less to me. Some of your letters I show to House and discuss the substance of them all with him. He feels as I told you that through you he is being kept in close touch with what is going on in Europe and he is really very grateful for it, and of course it enables me to get information from him in exchange. You are doing exactly what I could never get them to do before—that is, sending me inside information about everything that is going on. In this way House and the President have come to regard me as perhaps their chief source of information, and surely this is of some advantage. I presume you are seeing all the cables I send to Reading and those he sends to me.

I see by the last cable that Reading has decided to continue his present position under the same conditions as before. Perhaps this is the line of least resistance and if he is satisfied I do not think we ought to object. It is of course quite unthinkable that he should give up the job. There is no one else who could approach his value. I still think, however, that he should make arrangements to visit England fairly frequently. You know all the reasons in favour of it and I think agree they are sound.

As soon as possible after Reading returns I shall try to get over. For your very private information it is not impossible that House may come over this winter. In fact the one thing at present which prevents him making definite plans is the feeling that the situation is changing so rapidly that it would be better for him to wait until we reach something like a definite pause for the winter. Also he thinks it likely that German peace proposals may be sprung on us at any time and he would like to discuss them with the President and then come over to Europe. If he goes of course I should go with him. But if he decides to postpone his trip indefinitely, he will probably want me to take a short trip over there, say in November.

Your letter of the 13th about Imperial Preference is particularly

interesting. We must watch this situation very carefully. The President seems to think that the Allies, particularly England, want to form an economic alliance against Germany after the war. The thing has evidently been put to him in quite the wrong way and he thinks that we want to smash German trade permanently. He is determined that America shall be no party to this policy and would very quickly and definitely disassociate himself from any pronouncement along those lines. At the same time he is quite willing that economic pressure should be used, if necessary, after the war to force Germany to live up to the terms of the Treaty of Peace. He really has very much the same idea as our people, but the extremists of the Tariff Reform League have scared him a bit.

I should like you to keep me well informed as to the developments of our economic policy and I will try and do the same by you. I am making a start by sending you by this mail some confidential memoranda giving the American viewpoint.

It is also interesting to receive your notes on the situation in France. I do not think the U.S. Government are very well informed by their agents about political conditions in France and the French Embassy here is, as you know, far from being in close relations with the Administration.

I am puzzled about the situation in Siberia. All our advices seem to show that the Czecho-Slovaks are in grave danger. Yet Dr. Masaryk who is in Washington does not seem to take a very serious view of the position and all the advices the American Government receive tend to show that the Czechs are reasonably secure. I hope now that General Graves has reached Vladivostok and that Knox and Elliot are there we may be able to get more reliable information. As far as the President's position is concerned he has lost faith and curiously enough practically lost interest in the Bolsheviks and is, I think, much more inclined to fall in with our programme than he was a few months ago.

I have just cabled Reading regarding cable which Barclay sent the F.O. about Gen. Poole at Archangel. This is a good example of how real trouble can be manufactured out of nothing. Undoubtedly the U.S.G. rather resent the way in which Poole is running things at Archangel and I should imagine that he is not getting on particularly well with the American representatives there—probably he is rather impatient with them. It is only necessary, however, to explain to the Administration the necessity

of the action which Poole has taken and to promise to do everything possible to respect Russian independence and the authority of the Local Board. I have no doubt that Lansing spoke quite sharply to Barclay and then Barclay rushed off and sent this cable. We have enough real difficulties without making unnecessary trouble for ourselves.

Reference your letter of August 20th, to which was attached a letter from Herron : I do not think you ought to take Herron too seriously. He is one of the many people who pose as an agent of the Administration with very little justification. It is rather amusing to hear that Herron has obtained the President's sanction for his reports to be seen by A. J. B. The President has probably forgotten all about Herron—certainly he does not know that Herron is sending reports to anybody. House gets all Herron's reports and reads them and finds most of them rather nonsense. Anyone can see Herron's reports as far as the Administration is concerned.

With reference to your letter of August 23rd, I can tell you where the distinguished Americans you mention get most of their information regarding labour conditions in England : it is through a man called Buckler who is attached to the American Embassy in London. I spoke to Eric about him last time I was in London and warned him that Buckler is an alarmist and more or less of a Bolshevik. There are, of course, many other Americans, journalists and others, travelling through England and France, and they most of them seem to me to take an unnecessarily gloomy view about labour conditions. Of course they take care not to get their information from anybody connected with the Government. If, however, you continue to keep me informed about the real labour situation, I can guarantee that House and the President will get the right information. For the rest, an occasional article by one of the American correspondents in London can help to give the public here a true view.

I am greatly interested in the proposal for a Mission of American business men which you outlined in your letter of the 30th. Please let me know how the scheme progresses. House has not heard anything about it, but thought the idea a good one.

I have to close down quickly to catch a boat which I have just heard is going.

I have not had time to read this letter so don't be surprised by all sorts of mistakes.

On September 23, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

Reading has gone to a War Cabinet this morning, but in my opinion it would have been much better if he had had a rest for the whole of this week, and I hope his incursion into affairs of State to-day will do him no harm. He has been thinking over again the question of personal intercommunication between the two countries, and he said to me this morning that he was not sure after all whether he would not decide to travel backwards and forwards to a greater extent than he had hitherto done. In any case he thought that between himself, yourself and me much greater personal contact ought to be established between the two sides of the water. I tell you this to show you that his mind is working back in the direction that you and House suggested to me before his departure. So far as I am concerned, this would seem to meet the views that I expressed to you in my manuscript letter of last week.

On September 27, 1918, Wiseman wrote to me :

I have just time before the mail goes to send you a line to thank you for your most interesting letter of Sept. 9th. I cannot express to you how useful it is for me to have this kind of inside information.

House often asks me for my advice or for an explanation of rumors which they have heard and do not understand and in practically every instance I have been able to discuss the matter with him intelligently and I hope to some purpose owing to the way in which you keep me informed.

I am very grateful for the way that you have backed me up on the Irish case. My first instinct on hearing about it was to leave it alone because I have more than I can do to look after my political work, but after talking with Nathan I became very much impressed with the possibility of making such an exposé of the whole Irish seditionist movement here as would discredit it in the eyes of the American people forever. I realized what a delicate matter it would be to handle and how necessary it would be for us to keep in the background and at the same time in close touch with the authorities here. As you know, Nathan and I worked together on the Indian sedition case with a good deal of success and I feel that we ought to take charge of this. Of course

practically all the work will be done by Nathan and my office downtown ; but I shall help him as I did before with the authorities and advise him on questions of policy.

I imagine you must have had a hard time persuading various officials to act, and act quickly, but I felt sure that you would realize the situation and see the importance of keeping control of this within our own group—I mean, you and I and Reading.

I apologize for this miserable attempt at a letter, but the mail is just off.

On October 8, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

Thanks very much for your letter of 14th Sept. You say therein that you have so many letters from me unanswered that you feel ashamed of yourself. I can assure you you need not, nor must you have any such feeling. I know how busy you are and your visit to the North Shore must have made you very much belindhand when you got back to New York. You must have, however, had a most interesting time, and the importance of the hours that you spent with House and the President cannot, I feel sure, be exaggerated. The closer relationship that you are able to establish with them, the easier will it be to steer through the difficult times that undoubtedly lie ahead. I do not propose to write you at any length on this particular subject as in a few weeks' time (unless anything happens to the contrary) Reading ought to be on your side of the water, and the matter will form a subject of discussion between you.

I am so glad to hear that my letters are of use to you and to House. I will do what I can to continue to help you in this way, although if events move as you would wish them to do you will soon yourself be on this side of the water. I am seeing all the cables that have passed between yourself and Reading, and indeed many of them that have gone from him to you have been drawn up by the two of us in consultation. Thanks for your comments on Herron. It is extraordinary how sometimes the views of alleged agents of one country are magnified in the minds of the officials of another country.

I am interested to hear what you tell me regarding the man Buckler, who reports in such an alarmist fashion concerning labour conditions in England. I have met Buckler and certainly

would not put myself in his hands if I required an accurate survey of matters in the labour world.

*Re the Sissons papers*—in view of what you tell us in your telegram regarding the attitude of the State Department towards their publication, we find it very difficult to understand the attitude adopted by Laughlin when he saw A. J. B. ; he insisted so violently that the papers ought to be published that naturally it was thought that he had the State Department behind him. This seems to be another instance of George Creel<sup>1</sup> trying to prove that he is top-dog. Personally, I always got along very well with Creel, and I think that we ought to endeavour to play the game by him. The view about him over here, of course, is that he is a person who ought to be fought and snubbed as he carries no real weight and is very unpopular in Washington. I have always combated that view to the extent of saying that if we try to snub Creel too much, we shall very soon find that we are snubbing the President !

I really do not know what is going to happen about a General Election. All the portents are pointing in that direction, and if at the end of November the war were pursuing its normal course, I should certainly say that a General Election would take place. But who can say what the month of November will bring forth ? If by any chance Turkey were to have come out of the war by then and the peace situation in Austria had developed seriously, it seems to me that the powers that be will be much too busy in the foreign political sphere to have any time to devote to domestic politics and the question of a General Election. On the other hand, it may well be that the Prime Minister would say to himself that if peace is in the offing, he must at all hazards have a General Election before it becomes an accomplished fact, in order to have behind him a party with which to advance into the reconstruction period. The long and the short of it seems to me to be that it is quite impossible for the Prime Minister to decide now what he will or will not be able to do six weeks hence. Events may move very rapidly and the situation may have changed to such an extent that any plan made now must necessarily be changed when that time comes.

In my telegrams I told you of an effort that was being made to bring Lloyd George and Asquith together. *Very privately indeed* I want to tell you just a little more about it. A suggestion was

<sup>1</sup> Chairman of the Committee of Public Information, U.S.A.

made to Lloyd George by a disinterested individual that he should bring Asquith into the Government as Lord Chancellor and let Asquith have the disposal of three Secretaryships of State and six Under-Secretaryships. Along with Unionists and Labour in the Government, the latter would present a united front to the country and to the enemy. Lloyd George replied that an effort in this direction had been made a year ago but that it had failed. He would not respond to the suggestion, he said, in any way whatsoever, and unless it were quite clear that if a similar suggestion were put to Asquith it would not appear as coming from him. If however, the suggestion were put to Asquith, he would be willing to give the latter the Lord Chancellorship, plus the three Secretaries of State and six Under-Secretaries. Asquith, however, must agree to a General Election and conscription for Ireland. The suggestion was then made to Asquith. He, however, turned it down. There the matter ended. I am very sorry indeed that the effort failed. There are only two or three people who know what took place, and I know I can rely upon you to keep it entirely to yourself.<sup>1</sup>

At the moment we are very anxiously awaiting news of what the President is to say in response to the German Peace Note. I may tell you for your very private information that Reading and I discussed for a long time this morning the question as to whether or not he should send you a telegram "hoping that the President would make no reply until after consultation with the Allies". Subsequently he discussed the matter with A. J. B. and it was decided that no telegram should be sent, but that we would await events.

Whatever the President's reply, it seems to me extremely doubtful that we have heard the last from Germany. I suggested to you in a telegram of September 26th that the German peace offer to Belgium of a few days previously was only the first of a series, and that in that direction danger lay ahead. I also said, you will remember, that she could justify reparation to Belgium, a neutral country which she had invaded, without thereby giving her case away against reparation for the invaded portions of France. Prince Max has now said that he is willing to "talk" about an indemnity to Belgium. This, it seems to me, is just a first step towards an offer of complete reparation which doubtless will soon come along.

<sup>1</sup> A full description of the conversations is given in *Master and Brother*.

I am sorry to find here (although I do not wish you to exaggerate this in your own mind) that there is some disposition in certain quarters to think that because Prince Max, a so-called "white" man, is now at the head of affairs, the whole character and the designs of the German Government have undergone a change, in short, that the leopard has changed or is about to change its spots. This, of course, is not only not the case, but it is just exactly what the German Government wish us to believe. I do not think for a moment that any of the Allied Governments will allow themselves to be tricked by outward appearances of this nature, but the fact that certain sections of the public may be inclined to think that the change in itself is proof of the democratisation of Germany and leads us immeasurably nearer peace, tends to throw into wide relief the importance of all the belligerent governments acting together and speaking with one voice.

You said to me in your letter under reply that House thought it likely that German peace proposals might be sprung on us at any time, and that he would like to discuss them with the President and then come over to Europe. It seems to me that the moment may be drawing very near, when his presence in Europe would be invaluable. But if he and you are over here it likewise seems essential that Reading should be in Washington in order to be able to discuss matters with the President. He turned over very carefully in his mind House's suggestion that he should stay on this side of the water, but came to the conclusion (and I feel that he was right in doing so) that now that he had fully expounded his reading of the American view to the Prime Minister, A. J. B., and to the War Cabinet generally, it would be much better were he to return in order to talk over with the President various outstanding questions, and to bring the British Government atmosphere to Washington. He is now very much better, and the rest during the sea voyage will put him quite on his feet again.

Edward Grey is speaking at a meeting of the League of Free Nations Society on Thursday. He has telephoned to say that he would like to see me, so I am going to see him to-morrow. I will tell you of my conversation with him in my next letter.

On October 10, 1918, I wrote to Wiseman :

Thank you very much for your letter of 17th Sept. enclosing

two very secret documents. You can rely upon me to do what you ask with regard to them. I am showing them to Eric, who will doubtless show them to A. J. B. Beyond that, however, they will not go, and no copies will be made. The documents are extraordinarily interesting, particularly the one relating to the interview. The other one is very interesting as indicating a point of view which, as you say, will need careful watching.

Many thanks for your second letter of 17th Sept. forwarding to me other confidential memoranda which are also extremely interesting.

The President's reply to the German Peace Note was published this morning. On the whole, its reception here has been favourable. There are, of course, people who say that it should have been more brief and very much more negative in its character. On the other hand, a Note of that nature would undoubtedly have antagonised large sections of opinion in this country, in France and in Italy. As regards the actual contents of the Note, it is yet too early to say whether or not it represents actually all that could be desired. I say this in no spirit of criticism, but naturally every word in such a Note counts either for good or for evil and requires, therefore, to be very carefully studied before a considered opinion is given upon it. On the other hand, I think it eminently necessary to tell *you* that certain high quarters here are of opinion that the President has gone too far in the direction of opening the door for an armistice without, at the same time, being certain of obtaining the necessary guarantees in regard to the actual acceptance of his Fourteen Points. Further it is said that the Fourteen Points are in themselves so vague, and circumstances have changed to such an extent since their issue, that a discussion upon them round a Peace Table might lead to results quite other than anticipated. I mention these views to you as some of the things that are present to the minds of certain people here, and as indicating the difficulties which we shall have to encounter the nearer we come to peace.

There has been a great "fluttering in the dove-cots" here to-day in regard to the "armistice conditions" drawn up at Versailles and the telegrams that have passed concerning them. It seems quite clear that there has been a misunderstanding on the part of the President as to what was actually intended. The Ministers at Versailles, of course, contend that the matter which they were discussing and the conditions to be proposed in the

event of an armistice taking place were of a purely military nature. On the other hand, the President might well say that it is difficult to separate the political from the military, and that in all these matters, therefore, he should be given an opportunity of discussion and consultation before any decision is arrived at. This, I take it, is actually his view, and it is in this sense that Reading has talked to A. J. B., and will to Lloyd George when the latter arrives back to-morrow from France. Occurrences of this nature all point, it seems to me, to the necessity for House's presence over here at the earliest possible moment. Whether or not he can or ought to stay here for any length of time is another matter, but, between ourselves, if the two Governments are to continue to pull unitedly together, it seems to me to be very important that there should be some sort of a check here upon the actions of Lloyd George. This can only be achieved by the constant presence on the spot of someone who can really speak authoritatively as from the President. Who else is there beside House who could act in this capacity? It has been suggested that Brandeis might be such a person, and that he and House might take it in turns to be over here. Everything in the future depends upon a close and cordial working arrangement between the President and Lloyd George. Even with Reading in Washington I do not think this object will be sufficiently guaranteed. The only way, it seems to me, to secure it is by having here one of the President's "men" who could speak with the fullest possible authority and to whom Lloyd George would listen. I know, of course, the difficulties of this vis-à-vis the President himself and his way of doing things, but I feel sure that the nearer we can get to an arrangement of this sort, the less likely is there to be any breach with consequences that may be fatal to the final adjustment of peace. The present atmosphere over here is a very disturbing one indeed. At Versailles Lloyd George and Clemenceau spent a great deal of time fighting with each other, but joined hands at once and found common ground in railing at Wilson!

Edward Grey had a tremendous reception to-day and made a great speech, which I think will be very useful and with which I feel sure the President will have agreed.

It looks as if Reading will be sailing towards the end of next week. As soon as he starts, I propose to go home to Scotland for about a week and have a complete rest. I am not at all sure

whether, if you come back shortly after his arrival, it might not be a good thing for me to go out to him while you are over here. I should, of course, very much like to see you and should very much miss doing so, but it is a question whether I should actually be doing any useful work while you are here, and on the other hand I might take the latest news to Reading and perhaps be useful to him for consultative purposes while you are away. I have been turning this over in my mind for some time, and the more I think of it the more it seems to me that this is the most useful thing I can do if and when you come over.

The foregoing letters—selected from amongst many communications of a similar character—provide an indication of some of the methods by which close and intimate contacts and exchanges of ideas were maintained between the Heads of the British and American Governments during the First World War. I have previously explained how the Goddess of Chance brought the methods into being and the manner in which they “grew up”. As to their usefulness to the cause of British-American co-operation for war-making purposes, I need only say that President Wilson and his intimate adviser Colonel House; Arthur Balfour, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and his Principal Private Secretary, Sir Eric Drummond (the Earl of Perth); Lord Tyrrell (at that time Head of the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office); Lord Milner, an important member of the War Cabinet; Lord Reading, British Ambassador in Washington; General Sir George Macdonogh, Director of Military Intelligence; and Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, Director of Naval Intelligence (one of the most brilliant “Intelligence” officers Britain has ever produced); were all at one in welcoming and in supporting the methods—unorthodox though they were—as a definite means of ensuring continuous and informed contacts of a most intimate and friendly nature between highly placed British and American statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic.

At the conclusion of hostilities in November 1918, steps were immediately taken to nominate the British Delegates to the Peace Conference to be held in Paris in 1919, and to set up the Secretariat to accompany the Delegation to Paris. Although it was known that Lord Reading would not have been averse to being appointed Adviser on American Affairs to the British Delegation, it was

felt by Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, that there was only one man for the post, namely, Sir William Wiseman. Accordingly, Wiseman in due course received the appointment, and throughout the Peace Conference his close friendship with Colonel House and the latter's staff, and the regard in which he was held by President Wilson, served as an intimate bond between the British and American Delegations, and rendered great service to the cause of harmony between the two. Wiseman's far-seeing and tactful activities were all the more important in that Lloyd George and President Wilson were temperamentally as far apart as the poles, and it was not infrequently necessary for Wiseman, either behind or in front of the scenes—working in conjunction with Colonel House—to file down rough edges and to smooth off sharp corners. The fact, moreover, that Wiseman was a great personal friend of Arthur Balfour's Private Secretary, Sir Eric Drummond, and also of Sir William (Lord) Tyrrell, made the more easy of travel the stony paths that were on many occasions encountered during the progress of the Conference.

As I have previously remarked, I had relinquished my direct association with Wiseman and House when the war came to an end, and had resumed my Parliamentary duties. On the other hand, I continued to keep in close touch with Wiseman, and from time to time, if he asked me to do so, I was able to assist him in his onerous duties in various ways. During the early part of 1919 I paid several visits to Paris, where I maintained contact with both Wiseman and House. Time and again these two found themselves in the position of endeavouring to bridge over some difference of opinion that had arisen between the President and Lloyd George in relation to the difficult international problems with which the Peace Conference was confronted, and which followed each other in rapid succession day after day. To the solution of these problems the staffs of the British and other Delegations devoted considerable study and attention, but the more important of them usually fell to be finally settled at meetings of what were known as the "Big Three". I call to mind an occasion in Paris when I went round to see Colonel House at the Hotel Crillon, where he and the American Delegates were staying. When I entered the room, House, after greeting me, said, "Your Prime Minister is a very eminent man but it is really very difficult indeed to work with him. I will give you an

instance. I especially went round to see him the first thing after breakfast this morning in order to clear up a point of difference which had arisen at our meeting [meaning the "Big Three" meeting] yesterday. We thrashed the whole thing out, and he finally agreed that at the meeting this afternoon he would lead off by proposing as a solution the agreement at which he and I had arrived. This was very important, because Clemenceau was taking an entirely different attitude, and it was essential that the President and Lloyd George should, if possible, see eye to eye on the matter, and voice the same opinion at the meeting. When the meeting opened this afternoon this particular matter, which had been adjourned from yesterday, was the first on the agenda. Lloyd George started speaking, but, to my amazement, instead of leading off with what we had agreed in the morning, he proposed something quite different which put the whole matter into the melting-pot again, and, of course, pleased Clemenceau very much. It is very difficult to work in conditions like that." "I agree," I said, "it must be very difficult for you. What a pity it is," I went on, "that Lloyd George did not ask Asquith or Grey to be a member of the British Delegation. He represented magnificently the will of the British Nation to win the war, and he did wonderful work at the Ministry of Munitions: But he lacked 'greatness' in matters of that nature, and one of his failings has been that he has been averse to following the guidance on difficult problems of foreign policy of those who really know all about them."

The last time I saw Colonel House was in 1936 on the occasion of one of the visits paid by my wife and myself to the United States to stay with President Roosevelt. We went round to his apartment, and the following morning he and I walked the length of several blocks, which was about as much—at the age which he had reached—as he was able to manage. We talked of the past, and of common friends—of Edward Grey particularly, to whom we were both devoted: of Arthur Balfour, Willie Tyrrell, Eric Drummond and others, especially Willie Wiseman for whom House had a deep affection and admiration. The international situation at that period formed also a subject of our conversation. Like Edward Grey, three years earlier, House had "seen the red light", and he viewed with perturbation the seeming indifference in Britain and in his own country to the endeavours—open for all the world to see—which were being

made by Nazi Germany to get ahead in rearmament. Colonel House—one of America's finest and most lovable sons—passed on 'before the German "guns before butter" policy plunged the world into the bitterest and bloodiest contest in all the long history of warfare.

## CHAPTER VI

### *Asquith, Lloyd George and Irish Home Rule*

AMONGST British statesmen, in and out of office, during the period covered in earlier chapters of this book, my mind goes back to Henry Herbert Asquith (Earl of Oxford), a Liberal Prime Minister under whom I served from my entry into Parliament in 1908 to the end of his Premiership in 1916. Asquith was pre-eminently a great gentleman ; a man of outstanding mental stature ; a master of the English language ; a highly skilled and eloquent Parliamentary debater ; and, underneath a somewhat austere exterior, a man of warm heart and of loyalty to his friends. In the House of Commons it was his wont to abstain from consorting with Members of the rank and file in the Lobbies, tea and smoking rooms, and when walking through the Division Lobbies he would do so in a detached manner, neither himself entering into conversation with Members around him, nor inviting approaches from them. It was this seeming stand-offishness—due in large part to shyness—which was responsible for the fact that, although Liberal Members of all sections regarded him with intense respect and with the greatest admiration, he never held their affections. On the other hand, in the days of the “ Budget ” and “ Parliament Bill ” struggles, they looked upon him as a rock upon which would break in vain the surging tides of acrimonious opposition, and were completely confident that, by the force of his clear vision, Parliamentary skill and unfaltering courage, he would lead them through stress and storm to victory.

In thus portraying Asquith as we, who were his followers, knew him, it will help to add colour to the picture if it be remembered that amongst the Members of his Ministry were men of outstanding ability and determination, and of independent views. No-one could say that a team composed of eminent personages of such varying characteristics as Lloyd George, Richard (Lord) Haldane, Lord Crewe, Edward Grey, John Morley, “ Lulu ” Harcourt, Augustine Birrell, John Burns, Reginald McKenna, Walter Runciman and Winston Churchill was an easy one to lead. But no-one in public life who lived through those times would have denied that it was a team which it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Asquith to

lead without the outstanding assistance he received in his task from my brother, the Master of Elibank, his Chief Liberal Whip. In an earlier memoir I have recounted at some length the story of the difficult and stormy times through which the Liberal Party passed in the years prior to the First World War—years which were a landmark in the history of social progress in Great Britain—and of the marked success of “The Master” in holding together the forces of progress, in and out of the Cabinet, until the main objectives of the Liberal Party had been attained. From those stern and protracted political struggles Asquith emerged in 1912—when my brother, on account of ill-health, had to retire from the Chief Whipship—with the prestige of a conqueror who had assaulted the citadel of vested interests, breached its walls and over-run its ramparts. In the following years between 1912 and 1914 he and the Liberal Party—supported by the Irish Nationalists under John Redmond and the Labour Party under Ramsay MacDonald—did their utmost to place Home Rule for a united Ireland upon the Statute Book. But Providence unhappily decreed that this far-seeing measure was to be defeated by the bitter and uncompromising hostility of Sir Edward Carson and his Unionist associates, and by the fact that the passing of the Home Rule Bill through the House of Commons for the third successive year under the Parliament Act synchronised with the outbreak of the First World War. This concatenation of fatal circumstances led, in the event, and very rapidly, to the disappearance of John Redmond’s moderate-minded Irish Nationalist Party; to its substitution by the Sinn Féin Party with De Valera at its head; and to the setting-up of the Irish Free State.

Looking back on those days, I am firmly of the opinion that, even after the so-called “Dublin Rebellion” in 1916, there was still a chance of saving the Irish situation from going from bad to worse. Had the Lloyd George Coalition Government taken its courage in both hands and introduced a generous measure for Irish self-government, there might yet have been time to rally the moderate elements in Ireland and to halt the rising tide of Sinn Féin. But instead of pursuing the path of conciliation the Lloyd George Government adopted methods of repression. One measure of coercion followed another, until there came into being throughout the South and West of Ireland a state of seething discontent and widespread rebellion against the Crown. Then

followed—in the words of *The Times* of March 27, 1945—"one of the most terrible chapters of Ireland's terrible history, a chapter of civil war, of murder, of repression and reprisals"—reprisals carried out on behalf of the Government by a body of armed constabulary known as the "Black and Tans", whose exploits merely served to enrage large sections of moderate, as well as Sinn Fein opinion, and rapidly to increase the numbers of De Valera's following. Faced with a desperate situation, the Government called for a Report upon the whole position. The Report showed that it would require several British Divisions to restore order in Ireland. The Lloyd George Coalition Government—Winston Churchill and Lord Birkenhead being amongst its most prominent members—at once capitulated; turned a political somersault; and invited representatives of the Sinn Fein Party to a conference to discuss terms of peace! From the conference, after protracted negotiation, issued a so-called Treaty, and the Irish Free State, Eire, was constituted—the only part of the British Empire which remained neutral in the Second World War. What a tragic story! Contrast it with that of South Africa. The policy of bestowing—as did Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and his Liberal Government in 1906—self-government upon the conquered Boer territories brought about the phenomenon of Briton and Boer, in the First and the Second World Wars, fighting side by side under a common flag.

During the period that the Lloyd George Coalition Government, from 1917 onwards, abstained from making any *real* attempt to settle the Irish Home Rule question on the lines of Dominion self-government, Asquith was urging them from his place in the House of Commons and from public platforms to go forward with a solution on this basis. Half-hearted efforts were made by the Coalition to draft an agreed Home Rule Bill, and in 1918, whilst I was in charge of the London end of the House-Wiseman Organisation, I was in touch with some of them. But the root of the trouble was that the Tory Members of the Government were—as they always had been—opposed to any generous measure of Irish Home Rule, and the Liberal Members, headed by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, showed no signs of attempting to over-rule them.

In the meantime the situation in the South and West of Ireland rapidly deteriorated, and the reactions in the United States commenced to become increasingly harmful to Anglo-

American relations. Through April, May and June 1918, Lord Reading, our Ambassador at Washington—with whom, as I have shown in another part of this memoir, I was in close communication—was constantly asking me to put the position as he saw it in the United States to the Prime Minister, and to urge the latter to do all that was possible to settle the Home Rule question on generous lines. The following telegrams which Lord Reading despatched to me from the Embassy at Washington indicate the position as he viewed it :

April 15, 1918. Lord Reading to Colonel Murray.

. . . . .  
 . . . . . To carry opinion here, and particularly Irish opinion of moderate tendencies, it would be necessary for British Government to declare its intention not only to stake its existence on passing of Home Rule measure but also its intention to put Act into operation at once. Fundamental trouble is that unfortunately Irish and their friends have lost confidence in passing of an Act. What they require is to see Act put into operation by a Government that will not shrink from it if serious opposition is raised. If Government is pledged to Home Rule and strives without delay to pass it, the President will, I think, find satisfactory answers to any representations made.

I have now given you views I have formed upon situation here without regard to any personal opinions I might hold were I still a politician in England. It may be said with truth that relations between United States and ourselves are improving daily, and it would be most unfortunate to revive dying prejudices which now mainly subsist upon grievances of discontented Irish. Key of situation is, I am convinced, public declaration in respect of Home Rule. I cannot find anything in reports of debates which amounts to it, and it may well be it cannot be given. If it can, no time ought to be lost in making it plain to all.

April 28, 1918. Lord Reading to Colonel Murray.

The information you supply is very helpful. I have refrained hitherto from public statement in my name upon

Ireland, but am hard pressed by Congressmen to issue statement for publication. They assure me that a letter by me would have more effect than the strongest article. Please send me draft of a statement which I could issue. If possible a message from the Prime Minister to me would be most effective. This may not be a possible course. If it is not, please send me the latest information stating what part of it I may publish.

All latest information confirms the view I originally cabled to you upon American situation.

I sent down the foregoing telegram to Sir Eric Drummond, Arthur Balfour's Private Secretary, with the following note :

*E. D.*

With reference to Reading's telegram ; any statement issued by him would necessarily have to be—and would be taken to be—authoritative as from the British Government. The Government, I assume, is not prepared at the moment to make itself responsible for any statement.

I suggest, therefore, that I telegraph Reading to the effect that in view of the statement to be made by the Prime Minister on the introduction of the Home Rule Bill next week, it is thought better that he (Reading) should not issue a statement at all.

A. C. M.      29/4/18

Sir Eric Drummond's comment was as follows :

I think Colonel Murray's view is right, but perhaps he ought to consult the Prime Minister.—*E. D.*

From Arthur Balfour came :

Yes.—*A. J. B.*

From the Prime Minister came :

I concur.—*D. Ll. G.*

May 12, 1918. Lord Reading to Colonel Murray.

There is, I think, in general, somewhat subtle change in



THE HON. SIR ERIC DRUMMOND, G.C.M.G.,  
AFTERWARDS EARL OF PERTH



American's views of Irish affairs which is gradually emerging. It is not yet pronounced enough to come into the open. Tendency is for Americans and moderate Irishmen rather to resent happenings in Ireland with regard to conscription which are alienating sympathy of many who have been good friends of Ireland in the past. If only a generous measure of Home Rule could be given I think it would satisfy all but extremists who would never be satisfied. Danger is, so far as I can read it from here, that a measure such as is discussed in Irish Press reports originating in London must displease both Nationalists and Ulstermen. My observations are based only upon probable effects of British Government policy upon America. The intelligent American understands that of course Ulster cannot be sacrificed, but he fails to understand why it cannot be safeguarded. Generally, my impression is that America would welcome fair and generous treatment of Ulster, provided that it forms part of Government of Ireland.

May 15, 1918. Lord Reading to Colonel Murray :

You will have seen my telegrams Nos. . . . . I should be very grateful for any information you can obtain as to history of Irish statement attributed to War Cabinet.

In view of official telegrams I have had from London and of personal messages from Prime Minister, it is inconceivable to me that statement should have been issued with any authority. If it had been so issued I could not remain British Representative here. It is obvious a glaring blunder has been permitted, and I trust recurrence will be prevented by strong measures.

May 24, 1918. Lord Reading to Colonel Murray.

I fear that opinion is growing that British Government is losing, if it has not lost psychological moment for introduction and passing of Home Rule. Whenever I get an opportunity I point out the difficulties besetting His Majesty's Government, especially as pro-German conspiracies are rife. Tendency among thoughtful men whilst appreciating difficulties is to think that every day's delay makes situation more difficult and troublesome.

High authorities here are very concerned at delay in introduction of Home Rule measure which would afford here the best answer to Irish agitation if only it be generously conceived.

June 24, 1918. Lord Reading to Colonel Murray.

Irish situation as explained by London Press based upon Lord Curzon's speech has produced bad impression in authoritative circles here, more particularly in view of earlier declarations of present Ministry. To speak plainly, general view of those that count is that situation has been badly muddled. Unless some explanation is given, and without delay, old state of affairs here with regard to Ireland will quickly be recreated. This would be most unfortunate as many who have hitherto been antagonistic to the British rule of Ireland have taken strong stand at present juncture against Sinn Féin and are in heart opposed to present agitation against enlistment in Ireland. Once more it will be said that the British Government has broken faith with Ireland.

## CHAPTER VII

### *Lloyd George and Foreign Policy : Home Rule Settlement Side-tracked*

IN 1917, shortly after Lloyd George had come into power, he created a Private Secretariat which was popularly known as the "Garden Suburb" because its members were housed in temporary wooden buildings in the garden of No. 10 Downing Street. It may be that in the stress of war it was necessary for the Prime Minister to increase the numbers of his Secretaries, but, with the increase in numbers, came a wide extension of his powers, and by and through the "Garden Suburb" the Prime Minister rapidly acquired for himself from other Ministers, principally from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, powers and privileges which should never have left their hands. To this fact was due—as I said at the time in the course of a debate in the House of Commons—the tendency for our foreign policy "to be conducted with no fixed principles, to lack stability of purpose, and to become increasingly opportunist and hand-to-mouth". As an instance of the extent to which Lord Curzon, when Foreign Secretary, allowed his powers and his duties to be filched away from him by Prime Minister Lloyd George, I quote the following letter which I wrote in 1928 to Lord Ronaldshay (Marquis of Zetland) :

It is some years since we were in the House together, but you will let me, I hope, send you my congratulations on the great work you have accomplished in your *Life of Lord Curzon*.

It is fascinating reading, and some parts of your latest volume have been of particular interest to me.

Should you care to glance at enclosed extracts from some of my speeches in the House of Commons (which I had compiled for another purpose), you will realise why I say this.

Unfortunately I was unable to attract any support for my views from the rest of the House, which at that time thought that Lloyd George could do no wrong and was almost completely under his domination ! It may have been a knowledge

of this latter fact which prevented Lord Curzon from asserting his proper and rightful authority in Foreign Affairs. In any event he did not do so, and the extent to which this was the case was brought home to me in a conversation I had with him at the end of 1919 in connection with the appointment of a British Ambassador at Washington to succeed Grey.

I went with Grey to America at the time that he went out there on his special Ambassadorial Mission in September 1919. I stayed with him in Washington for a couple of months, and then returned to London. Grey did not himself intend to stay for very long, and he was anxious that the right kind of person should be appointed as his successor. Before my departure from the United States Grey had come to the conclusion that Herbert Fisher would make an excellent Ambassador to succeed him, i.e. if Fisher were agreeable to go. Grey asked me if I would see Lord Curzon when I arrived in London and tell him his (Grey's) views on the subject. Accordingly, soon after my return I went to the Foreign Office and gave Grey's message to Curzon. The latter's reply astonished me! He said he quite agreed with Grey that Herbert Fisher would make a very good Ambassador to the United States, but that, if I wanted to help bring about the appointment of any particular person, I had "better go and convince the Prime Minister by whom the appointment will be made". "I don't quite understand, Lord Curzon," I said. "Grey asked me to come and see you because he naturally thought that, as was the case in his time, it would be you as Foreign Secretary who would be making the recommendation for the appointment of his successor." "I can only repeat", replied Curzon, "that the appointment will be made by the Prime Minister, and that your message ought to be delivered to him." "Thank you, Lord Curzon," I said, "Grey's message was for *you*, and I have delivered it"—and I took my departure. Having been for five years before the war Parliamentary Private Secretary to Grey, and knowing something of the procedure of Ambassadorial appointments, these illuminating answers of Curzon's gave me some insight into the "working of the machine" in the days of the great Dictatorship!

I may add (a) that I had previously sounded Herbert Fisher and he had said that the appointment would appeal to him; (b) that the views of the Dictator were other than those

of Grey and the Foreign Secretary and—prevailed ! Auckland Geddes, the nominee of Dictator Lloyd George, was appointed !

Shortly after the creation of the Lloyd George Secretariat, Professor W. G. S. Adams—the distinguished Warden of All Souls College, Oxford, from 1933 to 1945—volunteered his services, and in due course was installed in the “Garden Suburb”. The principal “Garden Suburb” Secretary at that time was Philip Kerr, later Marquis of Lothian—Ambassador in 1940 to the United States, where he died. I knew Kerr, and the extent to which Lloyd George and the “Garden Suburb” had encroached upon our foreign policy made it necessary for me—during “House-Wiseman-Murray” days—to see him from time to time in connection with American affairs. In the course of my contacts with Philip Kerr I met Professor Adams, and struck up a friendship with him. As time went on I took him into my confidence in respect of the messages which were passing through me from Reading in Washington to the Prime Minister urging a settlement of the Irish problem. Adams—a man of great intelligence, broad outlook and vision—was fully seized of the desirability of arriving at a settlement of this distracting and long-drawn-out question, and was very anxious to bring the whole matter to a satisfactory conclusion. Upon him devolved the main burden of trying to assimilate the varying opinions on the subject which prevailed in the Cabinet ; of getting them all together into the same crucible ; and of forming an amalgam in the shape of an agreed Home Rule Bill which could be presented to Parliament. I had many conversations with Adams on the subject, and he kept me continuously and closely in touch with the whole situation. He had set up a Home Rule Bill Drafting Committee with himself in the chair, and made effort after effort to arrive at a compromise which would be acceptable to the different Parties involved.

As showing the manner in which the situation developed, and some of its difficulties, I quote from letters from myself to Sir William Wiseman in New York. In the course of a letter to Wiseman dated August 10, 1918, I wrote :

I had a talk yesterday with Adams. He told me that the previous day there had been a meeting of the Drafting Com-

mittee. After the Committee was over, Smuts made to Adams a very significant remark. He said: "In South Africa we fought the English for many years, but I have never there seen anything approaching the hatred that exists between the Nationalists and the Ulstermen in Ireland". Walter Long, Smuts, Addison and Shortt were present at the meeting of the Committee. It appears that they were agreed that the Bill which they had drafted (loaded down, as you know, on the side of Ulster) was not one that they could present to the House of Commons with any prospect of its being accepted by that body. They were, therefore, constrained to find a new solution. Shortt was asked his opinion as to the general lines of the Bill that he would favour. He replied that he would give to Ireland customs and excise and to Ulster county option. He was then asked which would be more acceptable, a Parliament for the whole of Ireland with a system of veto enabling Ulster to veto legislation affecting her interests, or a Parliament for Ireland giving to Ulster the option of voting herself out by counties. Shortt replied that the latter would be most acceptable. I entirely disagree with him and Adams does so too. Smuts apparently said that the veto system would be unworkable. Neither Adams nor I agree with this view, nor does Sir Frederick Liddell, the Parliamentary Counsel. I suggested to Adams that the matter was largely one of tactics. The Drafting Committee ought to be got away from the idea that they could frame a Bill for introduction which would be acceptable to both sides. What they should do is to frame such a Bill as in the first instance would get the Nationalists with the Government on Second Reading. Having done that, even though the Ulstermen did not accept the measure, it would certainly reach the Committee stage. In Committee, amendments bringing it more in consonance with the views of Ulster could be introduced; and many of them would probably be agreed to by the Nationalists with a view to getting the Bill in some form or another. Even if the Nationalists voted against such amendments and against the Third Reading of the Bill, their case would be weakened, and conversely the case of the Government would be strengthened, assuming that these amendments turn the Bill into a fair and reasonable measure as looked at from the point of view of Great Britain and America.

Adams is going to try to make some headway on these lines.

On August 30, 1918, in a letter to Wiseman I wrote :

There are no startling developments in regard to the Home Rule Bill. The Drafting Committee is at work again endeavouring to re-shape in certain respects the Bill at which they had arrived some few weeks ago, and this process, it seems to me, will go on and on during the tenure of office of the present Government. Personally, I doubt very much whether this Government, composed as it is, will ever present a Bill to the House of Commons. They make what seems to me to be a futile endeavour to frame a Bill acceptable (from start to finish) to both sides. If they could frame such a Bill, so much the better, but unless they can perform miracles, I fail to see how their object in this respect can be achieved. What is quite clear is that so long as Carson thinks there is a possibility of killing Home Rule, he will not become a party to any agreement. Much better, therefore, that the Government should get the Nationalists with them on Second Reading, and allow the acceptance of such Ulster amendments as would turn the Bill into a fair one in the eyes of the public, and then state definitely that they propose to make every effort to place such a Bill upon the Statute Book. This would be the wise course, but whether with the War Cabinet composed as it is at present, it is possible to adopt such a course, is quite another matter !

I went round to see T. P. O'Connor a few mornings ago and had a talk with him. His views, of course, are coloured, but unquestionably there is much truth in what he told me regarding the present very unsatisfactory state of affairs in Ireland. More and more the power of the Constitutional—i.e. the Nationalist Party—is being undermined by the extremists, and the present "military" rule in Ireland, outwardly satisfactory, conceals in fact deep seated unsettlement throughout the country. It may be that if the Irish recruiting campaign has a fairly good start (and there are some signs of improvement) the resultant effect will be to restore to the Nationalists some of their lost power. I devoutly hope that this may be so, but nothing, of course, can bring any permanent good

results to bear upon the situation until the Government tackle the Home Rule question in earnest without special and undue regard, as hitherto, to the interests of Ulster. You may, of course, say that my views in this matter are biased and I should forgive you for doing so ! But I can assure you that there are many men in the Unionist Party who hold the same views.

In a letter to Wiseman dated September 24, 1918, I wrote :

I mentioned to you in a telegram a few days ago that I had seen Horace Plunkett, and that he was more pessimistic than usual about the Irish situation. He has, in my opinion, good reason to be so. No betterment in the situation will ever be brought about until Ireland is granted some measure of Home Rule. Thanks to the policy pursued during the past year, the prospects of the Nationalist Party (that is to say, the Constitutional Party) are becoming more and more gloomy. Its organisation is falling to pieces, its party funds are gradually diminishing, and in the event of an election it seems probable that it will lose many seats to Sinn Féin candidates. The inevitable has happened. If the Government had shown some signs of supporting the Constitutional Party, the extremists would have made much less headway. As it is, the Constitutionalists have fallen between two stools and are gradually losing their power.

The voluntary recruiting campaign has been a failure. The time limit has been extended to November 1st, and the War Cabinet will have to make up its mind in the very near future what policy it proposes to adopt. Adams is coming to see me this afternoon, but I am afraid there will not be time for me to let you know the result of our conversation. I will inform you, however, of it in due course. All that I can tell you at the moment is that he is busily engaged with the Drafting Committee, endeavouring to find yet another solution of the Home Rule question which would be more satisfactory to the various parties concerned. The Committee pours forth solutions in an endless stream, none of which, up to date, have been acceptable to anyone. Perhaps (and let us hope so) the day will come when things will take a turn for the better.

I lunched with Francis Hopwood (Lord Southborough as he now is) a few days ago. He sails in a few days for India as

Chairman of a Committee which is to draft a scheme of government for India founded on the recommendations of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. I said to him that he had on hand a profoundly important task of a nature indeed that was given to few men to perform. On the results of his labours will depend the peaceful progress and development or otherwise of the Indian Empire throughout many generations to come. He told me that even now there was a tendency in certain quarters of the War Cabinet to adopt the attitude that no agreement had been reached inside that body on the subject of Indian reforms. He proposed, however, to go ahead on the assumption that there could now be no "turning back", and that if his Committee could frame reasonable proposals, the reactionary elements in this country would be swept aside and engulfed in the popular demand both here and in India that legislative sanction should be given to his scheme. I sincerely hope that it is in this direction that matters will develop. Our "Bourbons" seem to be imbued with the same spirit as has guided their action in regard to Ireland. "They have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing." Public opinion will inevitably over-ride them, but the pity of it is that the over-riding process seldom takes place until much harm has been done.

Hopwood's estimate to me of Horace Plunkett as Chairman of the Irish Convention, was, I am afraid, not a very high one! He told me that when the question as to the selection of a Chairman finally came before the Convention (after work in this connection had been done behind the scenes) Barrie, the leader of the Ulster Unionists, got up and said in Horace Plunkett's presence (the Duke of Abercorn being temporarily in the Chair), "We will accept Sir Horace Plunkett as Chairman of the Convention because we cannot find anyone else who will take it. We know that he will be a bad Chairman and we know that he will be unfair to the Party that I have the honour to lead."

On one occasion, Hopwood told me, during the sittings of the Convention a vote took place which resulted in a tie. Plunkett then proceeded to give his casting vote. Just as the applause of the victors was dying down, he suddenly found that his vote had been given in favour of the Ulster Party, whereupon he jumped up, said that he had made a mistake

and proceeded to give his vote to the other side ! Upon this, Stephen Gwynn (the Nationalist) rose in his place and said : " Mr. Chairman, we have now two ties. Do you not think it a good thing to manipulate the proceedings so that we may have a third ? "

It may well be that Sir Horace Plunkett was not the ideal man to be Chairman of the Irish Convention, but if he was not the man one of the reasons was that he was too great and too kind-hearted a gentleman, and not enough of a " tough nut " to deal with some of the Ulster Tories whom the Convention numbered amongst its members. In any event the deliberations of the Convention came to naught. The position went from bad to worse. I quote from a letter which I wrote to Sir William Wiseman on July 28, 1919 :


As you have no doubt noticed, I have been pegging away in the House at the questions of the Washington Embassy and the New York Consul-Generalship. The former appointment ought to be settled within a few days. Herbert Fisher told me last week that it had not been offered to him. I said that I hoped that, if it were offered to him, he would accept it. He replied that he considered the post so important that anyone to whom it was offered ought to accept it. Lloyd George has, I know, had his name in mind, but thinks (so far as I can gather) that he is too useful a man to lose. This is just one of my complaints against Lloyd George—that he often takes too narrow and short a view of situations which confront him, and looks too much to the political situation of the moment at home without visualising the large problems with which we have to deal abroad. This is emphasised by his present attitude on the question of Ireland. He fails or refuses to recognise that every day of delay in an attempt to settle the Irish question more and more endangers our Imperial and Anglo-American relations. He is inclined to take the view that the Irish question is a domestic question and concerns the United Kingdom only. Several of us in the House have been doing our best to impress upon the Government the urgent necessity of exploring all paths leading to a settlement. The Government must, of course, consider a plan sooner or later seeing that the Home Rule Act comes into operation on the official termination

of the war, that is to say—about the month of February next. I am not sure that they do not wish to place the responsibility for suggesting legislative proposals on to a Parliamentary body which is shortly to be set up to consider the question of a Federal devolution. As this body, however, is not likely to get to work until September, or perhaps October, it is very improbable that it will report before the Spring of next year. In the meantime, apart from Horace Plunkett's scheme which was recently issued, the only proposals that show some signs of forming the basis of a practical and reasonable system of government for Ireland are contained in a leading article in *The Times* of July 24th. You have probably read this article, as I understand from Campbell Stuart that he caused it to be published simultaneously in American and Dominion newspapers.

The pity of it is that Carson still seems to exercise a magic influence over the Cabinet. He made on the 12th July in Belfast a deplorable speech threatening (as in the days before the war) to call out the Ulster volunteers in the event of the Government coming forward with proposals for an "All Ireland" Parliament. "We will not", he said, "have the Home Rule Act now on the Statute Book, nor any other Act." The adjournment of the House was moved on the following day to call attention to the speech, and the motion set down on the Order paper asked that the ordinary processes of the law should be put into operation and that Carson should be prosecuted. The Government, in reply to the debate, said that no action would lie. From every quarter of the House the terms and tone of Carson's speech were denounced. Bonar Law had a great opportunity, but he refused to take it. I did not catch the Speaker's eye myself during the debate, but just before Bonar Law sat down, I asked him the direct question: "Do you disapprove of the speech?" His response was: "I cannot judge my right honourable friend during his absence". How weak, and indeed how disastrous from the point of view of the political and labour situation with which we are confronted. Member after member from the Labour benches asked the Government how it was possible for them (the Labour members) to counsel moderation, and denounce direct action in speeches to labour audiences, when the Government in the case of Carson expressed no disapproval of speeches

inciting to violence. And, of course, to arguments such as this there is no reply. If the Government will not prosecute Carson, it will be more and more difficult for them to prosecute revolutionary agitators. Indeed, one might say that Carson's speech and its sequel has rendered much more anxious the Labour situation with which the country is now faced. I know of no Tory member who did not disapprove of the speech. George Younger—who, after all, is very representative of Tory opinion in the House and in the country—said to me that he thought the speech was perfectly monstrous.

The direct result of Lloyd George allowing Carson and his anti-Home Rule companions to have their way was to encourage in Ireland the conditions which became more and more favourable to De Valera and his Sinn Féin supporters and ultimately to end in the creation of the Irish Free State, which—as I have previously said—was the only constituent portion of the British Commonwealth to stand officially outside the Second World War—although it should be noted to the credit of many brave Irishmen and Irishwomen that 167,000 volunteers from within Eire's borders served in H.M. Forces during the titanic struggle.



The American Ambassador  
(J. W. Davis)

The Earl of Reading

The U.S. Secretary of State  
(R. Lansing)

AT THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN OFFICERS' CLUB, 9 CHESTERFIELD GARDENS, MAY 14, 1919



## CHAPTER VIII

### *Scheme to attempt to bring Southern Ireland into the First World War quashed by Small-mindedness*

BEFORE leaving the vexed subject of Irish Home Rule at the period of which I have been writing, it may not be without interest to recount the story of an attempt that I made to pour oil upon the troubled waters.

When thinking over the whole position one day in 1918—whilst I was Assistant Military Attaché in Washington (the Military Attaché, General McLachlan, being away at the time inspecting American training camps)—an idea suddenly occurred to me. In conversation with one of the U.S. General Staff at the War Department some days previously I had been told that a Division in the U.S. Army composed largely of Irish-Americans was approaching the end of its training period, and would shortly be despatched to the Western Front in Europe. The idea that entered my mind was that this Division—or elements of it—should be disembarked at Cork; marched through Ireland; and be embarked again at Dublin; and that, during its march, it should be allowed to enlist Irishmen as recruits. A scheme of this nature, as it seemed to me, might help to bring Southern Irishmen into the war in large numbers, and might perhaps bring about a solution of the troublous and anxious problems which revolved round the question of conscription in Ireland and Irish Home Rule. The scheme no doubt was of an unorthodox nature, but the more I thought about it the greater became my enthusiasm! A few days later I went down to the War Department and expounded the scheme to a member of the General Staff with whom I was on particularly friendly terms. He thought for a few moments, and then said: "I would do anything I could to help in this difficult Irish situation that you British have on your hands, especially as I know how it is affecting good relations between our two countries, and on the face of it I think there is a good deal to be said for your scheme. However, I will think it over, and if it really does seem practicable I will talk to some of our Staff about it." I thanked him warmly and went back to my office.

Three or four days afterwards my friend asked me to go

down to the War Department to see him. He said that he had discussed the matter with other members of the General Staff and that no objection in principle had been taken to my project ; but that two conditions were essential to its fulfilment. Firstly, of course, that the consent of the British Government should be obtained ; and secondly, that Britain should furnish the necessary shipping. I was highly elated at this favourable reception of my scheme at the hands of the U.S. General Staff, and I told the General that I would immediately get to work in the sense that he had suggested. I went back to the Embassy ; told Reading, our Ambassador, the whole story ; and asked him whether he approved of my going forward with the scheme. He at once gave his hearty consent. " Anything, my dear Arthur," he said, " that can help solve this terrible Irish problem is worth trying. So far as my end of it is concerned, go ahead. I will leave it to you to let me know from time to time how you are getting on."

The first essential, as it seemed to me, was to make certain of the necessary shipping space. Accordingly, I went down to New York to talk the matter over with Sir Thomas Royden (later Lord Royden, Chairman of the L.M. & S. Railway Company), who was Head of the British Ministry of Shipping in the United States. Royden—a man of outstanding commercial and financial ability, of broad vision and of great tact and charm—responded at once by telling me that the scheme seemed to him to be a splendid one, and that he would do all he could to help. He said that he would see what ship or ships he, in conjunction with his colleagues in London, could arrange to release for the purposes I had expounded to him. I returned to Washington and told my story—it now having reached a fairly advanced and satisfactory stage—to the Counsellor of the Embassy, (Sir) Colville Barclay, and to the First Secretary (Sir) Malcolm Robertson. Colville Barclay had been Counsellor for some four or five years. He was a wise and far-seeing diplomat, universally popular in all American and British circles in Washington. He ended up a very successful diplomatic career as British Ambassador to Portugal. Malcolm Robertson was likewise a very able diplomat and a likeable personality. Later he became Deputy High Commissioner for the Rhineland and a successful Ambassador to the Argentine, and throughout the Second World War, when a Member of Parliament, held with distinction the post of Chairman of the British Council. Both Barclay and Robertson

were very interested in my scheme, and heartily wished it success. A few days later Royden telephoned me, and asked me if I would go to New York to see him. I travelled to New York that night and met him in his office the following day. He said, "I am glad to say that I have fixed up something for you. I can give you the *Mauretania*." "A very nice present indeed," I replied. "Thank you most warmly." He then told me the dates she would be available and the number of troops she would carry. After a further talk I returned to Washington. The following day I went down to the War Department and saw my Staff friend. I told him of my conversation with Royden, which he was delighted to hear. "Now that the matter is cut and dried so far," I said, "the only thing left to do is to get the consent of the British Government." I went back to the Embassy; saw Reading, who was very pleased with what I told him; and then—after I had seen Colville Barclay—I went to Malcolm Robertson's room and together we drafted a despatch which asked for the assent of H.M. Government to the scheme. The despatch went off the following day. So far so good—and those of us in the project at the American end of the scene were entitled to think that it was *very* good. But the hopes we built up were doomed to disappointment. A few days after the despatch had arrived in London I had to go down to the War Department and announce to my friend on the U.S. General Staff that the British Government had refused to sanction my project because they were not prepared officially to countenance a scheme which invited Irishmen to fight under the American flag. I was quite frank with my friend as to my views on the small-minded and short-sighted nature of this decision. "What a chance lost," he said—we left it at that. Reading, Barclay and Robertson were equally disappointed. What on earth did it matter, as they and I agreed, under what flag Irishmen fought so long as they fought against our common foe? How would this puerile principle have worked out if it had been applied to Americans in the Second World War who streamed across the Canadian border to fight with great gallantry as airmen, sailors and soldiers in the Canadian Forces *under the British flag*? Fortunately Mackenzie King—Canada's great and courageous Prime Minister through the Second World War—did not allow himself to be influenced by the pettifoggery and narrow-mindedness which had characterised British governmental decisions in similar—if reversed—

circumstances twenty years previously. Nor did the United States Government place an embargo on the daring and very gallant members of the famous Eagle Squadron, or, generally, upon its citizens who fought under the British flag during the years between the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 and the date on which America entered the struggle. We will leave the story at that. Unless the unimaginative action it records had actually taken place the ordinary person would assuredly say that it was quite incredible !

## CHAPTER IX

### *Franklin Delano Roosevelt*

DURING the course of my duties as Assistant Military Attaché in Washington, 1917-18, I made many friendships with Army and Navy officers, and with members of President Wilson's Administration. Frank L. Polk, Assistant Secretary of State, a man of great ability and charm, was a particular friend of mine; as were also John W. Davis, the Solicitor General, and William Phillips of the State Department, both of whom at later dates became highly successful and very popular American Ambassadors, the one in London, and the other in Rome. In the Second World War Phillips, at the request of General Eisenhower, became the latter's Adviser on Political Affairs in Europe, and in 1946 he was appointed a member of the Palestine Commission. Another member of Wilson's Government with whom I established close relations, and whose friendship from those days I continued to enjoy, was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt; debonair, quick-witted, athletic, breathing health and virility; cheery, warm-hearted and fiercely determined to get at the Hun by every means in his power. Looking back on those days I see this man, though a junior member of the Government, nevertheless one of its most powerful assets for war-making purposes. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy he had the great advantage—an advantage which his country and its Allies shared in both the First and Second World Wars—of having known Europe intimately from his youth, and of having been at school in Germany: a fact not widely known or appreciated. In this connection the following letter which he wrote me early in 1940 may be of interest:

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON  
March 4, 1940

DEAR ARTHUR,

It is grand to get your letter of February eighth. I heartily concur in all you say—and remember that I, too,

went to school—a village school—in Germany and, indeed, spent almost every Summer there until I was fourteen years old.

In those early nineties I gained the distinct impression that education and outlook under the old Kaiser and under Frederick was quickly and almost suddenly changed when Wilhelm, II, came to the throne. When I was eleven in 1893, I think it was, my class was started on the study of "Heimatkunde"—geography lessons about the village, then about how to get to neighbouring towns and what one would see, and, finally, on how to get all over the Province of Hesse-Darmstadt. The following year we were taught all about roads and what we would see on the way to the French border. I did not take it the third year but I understand the class was "conducted" to France—all the roads leading into Paris.

The talk among us children became stronger each year toward an objective—the inevitable war with France and the building up of the Reich into the greatest world power. Even then we were taught to have no respect for Englishmen, and we were taught that Americans were mere barbarians, most of whom were millionaires.

It is mighty difficult for us over here to realize the real difficulties which the blackout entails on all members of the community in Britain—and I think that you, knowing this country well, will understand when I tell you, as I told King George in 1918, that it is extremely difficult for the average American to appreciate what living day and night in the actual theatre of war means.

Furthermore, there has been so little of the dramatic during the past six months that probably a majority of Americans have been, to a certain extent, lulled into a feeling that the relative land inactivity will continue.

I am happy, of course, that your government and the French are on the whole so frank with us. Incidentally, I imagine that I am getting better information from the world as a whole (except Russia) than anybody else. Public opinion here is in good shape in spite of the extreme isolationists, and I do not think that you people have to worry about it as far as we can now tell.

Give my love to Faith, and do take care of yourselves—both of you—and remember that when this disagreeable but very

necessary business is over we are expecting you both to make Hyde Park your first port of call.

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

P.S. Go on keeping me posted.

In addition to his intimate knowledge of Europe and of international affairs, Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, possessed another important advantage, namely, that he had always been a great lover of the sea, and had a natural aptitude for naval warfare and for finding his way through seafaring problems. This love of the sea showed itself in his liking for pictures and prints of ships and seacraft of every description. But his interest lay chiefly, as was natural, in the American Navy, and his collection included naval books and many letters and prints and models of ships. His collection was of quite a sizable nature when he became Assistant Secretary of the Navy, but the years which he spent in the Navy Department not only gave him great opportunity to add to it but also increased his ardour as a collector. In this connection an amusing reminiscence comes to mind. In the month of March 1919, during the progress of the Peace Conference, I went to Paris at the request of Sir Eric Drummond (Lord Perth)—then Private Secretary to Arthur Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—to discuss with him a certain matter that had arisen in the course of the Conference negotiations. A few days after my arrival, our discussion of the matter was temporarily suspended, and Drummond said to me that it would in all likelihood be about ten days before we could resume our conversations. "I hate to keep you hanging about like this, Arthur," he said, "but it simply can't be helped." "I quite understand," I replied, "and as there is nothing doing in the House at the moment I will take the opportunity of slipping off for a week to the South of France where I haven't, of course, been since before the war." Accordingly, I made my arrangements to take the Blue Train to Monte Carlo the following night. At the hotel in Paris at which I was staying was also residing Franklin Roosevelt, who as Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy, was in Paris as the member of the U.S. Government in charge of the demobilisation of U.S. Naval Forces in European waters. On the morning of my departure for Monte Carlo we met in the

hall of the hotel. "I've a first-class suggestion to make to you, Franklin," I said. "What's that, Arthur," he replied. "Well, it's this," I responded. "I'm going to Monte Carlo to-night for a week, and I want you to come too. It'll do you a lot of good, and we'll have a grand time together." "I just wish I could; I'd simply love it," was his rejoinder. "But I can't manage it. I've got a real hard week ahead of me, and I can't get out of any of it." "Well, if you can't, you can't," I replied, "but it would have been lovely all the same." "But I've had a grand idea," he added. "I'll give you something to do for me at Monte Carlo. You can win me a set of naval prints which I saw in a shop yesterday!" "What do you mean?" I asked. "Well," he said, "here's a louis. Walk straight into the rooms and put it on 35 on the first table you come to on your left. And if it comes off I'll buy those naval prints." "Right oh!" I replied, taking the louis, and—it *did* come off! But that was not the first or the last time in my experience that gambles at Monte Carlo of this nature *have* come off! On my return to Paris I told F. D. R. that his luck had been in, whereat he laughed heartily and was mightily pleased. But when I said to him that, as his agent in the transaction, I would, of course, have to charge my expenses—he had a heartier laugh, and promised me a dinner instead. That day, with the proceeds of his gamble, he acquired the set of naval prints, which he showed to me, saying that he proposed to name it "The Arthur Murray Collection" and hang it on the walls of his home in America. There, at a later date, I inspected the collection—a very nice set of prints indeed!

Looking back on that visit to Monte Carlo there comes to mind another matter of passing interest. At that time Monte Carlo, and the Côte d'Azur generally, was the resort for convalescing members of the American armies fighting in France, and an American army band was wont to play almost daily on the Monte Carlo Terrace. I remember thinking to myself what a strange thing it was that a band from the American armies recruited on the other side of the Atlantic should be playing at a Riviera resort, and I wondered whether anything of this kind would ever happen again. Little did the thought occur to me in those days that less than a generation later the Riviera coasts would be echoing to the marching feet of the resuscitated armies of the self-styled *Herrenvolke*, and that some years after that an

American army band would again be playing on the Terrace at Monte Carlo.

I saw a great deal of Roosevelt in those "First World War" Washington days, and, as neither he nor I were persons who loved "red tape", there was more than one occasion when we settled some problem that arose in the course of our official associations either at lunch at the Metropolitan Club, or after dinner in the evening at his own home. When I left Washington in the spring of 1918 for purposes mentioned in earlier chapters of this narrative, I continued to keep in touch with him by correspondence, and—as previously mentioned—made personal contact with him again in Paris at the commencement of 1919. In the autumn of that same year I saw him again on several occasions when I accompanied Lord Grey on the latter's special mission to President Wilson. He was still Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and still the same energetic and athletic figure that I had known from the beginning of our friendship. Still, of course, of the same straightforward, human, cheery and warm-hearted nature which had always so attracted me and which remained the dominant trait in his character to the end. In the summer of 1920 he was nominated for Vice-President of the United States by the Democratic Party, and later in the year opened his electoral campaign. A letter which he wrote me during the course of his extensive tour may be not without interest.

At SEDALIA, MO., October 9, 1920

DEAR ARTHUR,

It was awfully nice to get your cable back there in July when I was nominated. I am slowly but surely catching up with my correspondence, but it is a difficult process because I have been "on the road" almost continuously since the nomination. I have been living in a special car with a large staff, and have been speaking more than ten times a day, covering territory in more than thirty States, going out to the Pacific Coast, then back through the Middle West and New England, and now I am on a second western trip.

Of course the odds have been very much against our success, but we are cutting down our opponents' lead, and the

League of Nations is becoming the main feature of the campaign. Whatever the result may be, it will have been a most interesting experience.

I wonder much if there is any chance of your coming over this autumn. Do let me know beforehand if you do. I expect to spend November and December quietly at Hyde Park, and then if I am not elected to practice law in New York City.

It would amuse you to hear the questions put to me with regard to your everlasting Irish question. I wish to goodness you could find some way of taking it out of our campaign over here !

Give my regards to any of the old crowd you may happen to see.

Always sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt's boundless health and energy at the end of 1920 may be gathered from the tone and spirit of the foregoing letter. But, alas, in the physical sense stark tragedy was lurking round the corner. It had been the custom for many years for the Roosevelt family to spend their summer holiday on Campobello Island, New Brunswick, Canada, where they all walked together, bathed, sailed and fished to their hearts' content. In the summer of 1921 they assembled as usual at Campobello in the month of August. One afternoon, after returning from a sail at about four o'clock, Roosevelt, who had been complaining of feeling tired for several days, thought it would do him good to have a swim in a land-locked lake on the other side of the island. So, with two of his children, off they started, and, having had a swim in the lake, Roosevelt took a dip in the Bay of Fundy, and then ran home. On arrival at the house he found a pile of mail waiting him, and sat down in his bathing suit, which was not quite dry, to go through it. Shortly afterwards he said that he thought he had caught a chill, and decided that he would go straight to bed instead of waiting up for supper. He had a somewhat restless night, and the following day felt less well. A doctor from Lubec was summoned, who decided that it was an ordinary cold, and recommended that he should stay in bed. About three days passed, and it became apparent to Mrs. Roosevelt that her husband's lower legs were getting badly paralysed. A consultant

was called in from Bar Harbour, Maine, who decided that it was some form of paralysis but could not explain it.

The days went by, and there was no improvement. Finally, from Newport was brought in a well-known infantile paralysis doctor, who, after careful examination and consultation, pronounced that Roosevelt was suffering from infantile paralysis.

And then began the poignant story of prolonged suffering and of hard-fought and courageous battles against this dread disease. Placed on an improvised stretcher, the patient was taken down from the Campobello house over the rough, stony ground and beaches and lifted into a small motor-boat. Thence across the bay for two miles, and out of the boat on to a dray used for luggage in that part of the country. Every jerk and jolt brought severe pain with it, which was only partially relieved when the station was reached and the stretcher put through the window into a compartment of the private saloon coach which had been brought for the purpose from New York. Out through the window of the coach at New York, and by ambulance to the Presbyterian Hospital where the days and weeks went by as the future President of the United States battled manfully through the early stages of his terrible illness.

A year passed. The Christian faith, high courage and will-power of the man—aided by the tender care and never-ceasing attentions of his wife, Eleanor (a lady of striking personality and of great distinction and charm)—had won through to the beginnings of victory. By the autumn of 1922 Roosevelt was able again to live a normal life in most ways, restricted only by his inability to walk. Generally speaking, his physical condition improved thenceforward year by year, and his mental stature seemed to have become definitely greater than it was before the days of his illness. Resuming law practice with the firm of Roosevelt & O'Connor in 1924, he was elected Governor of the State of New York in 1928, and re-elected in 1930 by an enormous majority. In November 1932 he was elected President of the United States. At the time of his inauguration in March 1933, the United States was in the lowest and unparalleled depths of depression; millions of families did not know where to turn for the necessities of life; farmers and business men were desperate; banks were going down like ninepins everywhere; the country was in a paralysis of fear . . . on that March 4, 1933, there appeared from the close-packed throng in the great doorway of

the east front of the Capitol in Washington, the tall, square-shouldered figure of Franklin Delano Roosevelt . . . Roosevelt taking command of the storm-battered ship. At the first sight of the serene and gallant figure, at the first tones of his calm and confident voice, you could see the new spirit, the new determination, creeping into the faces of those people. Never was there a more instant or a more kindling response to the call of a leader—a leader with the true and authentic qualities of leadership.

The story of the years that followed to the day in 1945 that the noble soul of Franklin Roosevelt passed to its Creator is the story of a man encompassed by responsibilities and perplexities the like of which, in all probability, no human being has heretofore ever had to face. Men and women the world over know with what high and Christian spirit he faced them. To my wife and myself, who enjoyed his friendship, was given the happiness of seeing him at close quarters in the days when we stayed with him on several occasions during his Presidentship either at the White House or at his lovely home, Hyde Park, on the Hudson. The last such occasion was in October 1938, just after the crisis which will echo down the corridors of time as "Munich". Our visit to him had been arranged between us earlier in the year. Under date May 13 I received from him the following letter :

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON  
May 13, 1938

DEAR ARTHUR,

I have waited to write you until I could clear away my personal cobwebs by spending a week at sea on a Cruiser. I am just back from a delightful, smooth, warm weather voyage, all the way out to the easterly end of the Virgin Islands—three afternoons of fairly good fishing—much sunburn—and the relatively simple diet of the Navy.

While I was away the Florida primary election seemed to prove that the voters' hearts (and heads !) seem still to be in the right place—for the Administration's candidate won by a clear majority over the combined vote of four other candidates.

It is grand news that you and Faith will get here October sixteenth. According to my present plans, any time after

that date will be perfect, as I expect to be between here and Hyde Park from then to early November. It will be a good time of the year though already fairly cold. We will have a picnic on the top of a very high hill in the eastern part of Dutchess County, and I will have the President's yacht on the river to take you for a day's sail on the upper Hudson. You must both of you bring your oldest clothes! In that connection I do not think you can equal the following:

In 1878 my Father had a tweed suit made in Edinburgh—that was four years before I was born. He wore the suit constantly until his death in 1900. I inherited it, and wore it steadily until 1926, when I passed it on to my boy James. He still has it, and wears it in the winter time when he is in the country. A good example of Scotch craftsmanship, aided and abetted by Dutch thrift!

Things international and things economic seem to have reverted completely to a time-serving status—why in the name of common sense can't the poor old world come together and cast their thoughts at least twelve months ahead? In the old days we used to try at least to think a generation ahead. One of my cynical professor friends suggested that the world is becoming very Christian because it is following the precept "take no thought for the morrow". Isn't it amazing that in February there was no thought of the Eden episode, and in early March no thought of the Austrian coup? As I think I have remarked to you before, I am most worried when all you people on the other side unite in saying "there is no possibility of war"—perhaps for the good reason that every six months or so during the past five years when you have all united in gloomy predictions, things have miraculously smoothed themselves out!

Many thanks for sending me Runciman's letter. I hope he will come over here again one of these days to see some of the western and southern part of our country.

My best to you both,

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

In due course we booked our passage in the Anchor liner *Cameronia* which was timed to sail for New York from Glasgow on October 7. During August and into September the murmur-

ings of the Czech crisis grew steadily into a sullen roar, intensified by a snarling, domineering speech by Hitler to the Nazi Conference at Nuremberg on September 12. Two weeks passed—a period of great suspense, during which the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, flew twice (on September 15 and 22) to Germany for conversations with Hitler. On Monday, September 26, Hitler made a violent and abusive oration, and on the Wednesday he threatened to march into Czecho-Slovakia. The following day Chamberlain flew for the third time to Germany—to Munich. On Friday, September 30, it was announced to the world that a Peace Plan had been produced at one o'clock that morning. Through all these anxious September days my wife and I—at our home, An Cala on the Isle of Scil, Argyll—had been wondering whether our visit to the President was going to take place, or whether it was to be prevented by the outbreak of a European war. The so-called "Peace" Plan—what a hollow mockery!—set our travels in motion! On the day of its announcement I cabled to the President saying, "Now that the smoke has cleared away we are sailing on October 7 as arranged". The next morning we received from him a cable—which must have crossed mine to him—which read, "As smoke seems clearing am counting on your visit. What day do you and Faith arrive?"

At 12 noon on October 16—after an exceptionally rough passage across the Atlantic—we arrived at "Quarantine" outside New York Harbour. Captain Dan Callaghan, U.S. Navy, the President's Naval Aide—a charming and gallant officer, who died gloriously, as a Rear-Admiral, in a Naval combat in the Second World War—came off in a Naval cutter to meet us, bringing with him the following letter:

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON  
October 14, 1938

DEAR ARTHUR,

They tell me your ship gets in Sunday morning and I am sending this by my Naval Aide, Captain Callaghan, so you will know the plans.

Doubtless you and Faith will want to go to the hotel for a few hours, and then I hope that you will join me on my train at the Pennsylvania Station about 4.30 P.M. I will be on my

way to Hyde Park from Washington, and this will get us in time for supper at Hyde Park. Welcome !

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Captain Callaghan—my Naval Aide—will take care of you !

We joined the President on his train at 4.30 that afternoon, receiving a warm-hearted welcome from him. During the journey to Hyde Park the conversation turned to the recent Czecho-Slovak crisis and he told us how he had "listened in" to Neville Chamberlain's broadcast speech on the Tuesday of the "Munich" week. His story, in his own words—I made a note of them at the time—was as follows :

I arranged that I and my Cabinet should all listen together to Chamberlain's radio speech on the Tuesday. It came through to us on the short wave. When it was finished I looked round the table and there were tears in the eyes of at least four Members of the Cabinet, and I felt that way myself. I had listened to Hitler on the Monday, and so had most of my Cabinet. The contrast between the two just bit into us—the shouting and violence of Hitler, and the roars, through their teeth, of his audience of "Krieg, krieg", and then, the quiet, beautiful statement of Chamberlain's. I had intended to send a message to Hitler on the Wednesday morning. But on the top of Chamberlain's radio speech came news from our people in Berlin that Hitler was to take action at two o'clock on Wednesday afternoon. So I got down at once about five o'clock to the draft of my message, and Hull came across again from the State Department. By about nine o'clock we had hammered out the message, and Hitler had it with his breakfast. All this might perhaps interest Chamberlain. Will you tell it to him ?

We spent a very happy ten days at Hyde Park ; the weather, and the autumn colouring of the foliage, being at their best. The President was supposed to be enjoying a holiday, but it is seldom indeed that a President of the United States in modern times ever has a real holiday unless—as Roosevelt used sometimes to do—he takes it in a warship cruising far out to sea where wireless messages alone, and no human beings other than the ship's

company, can get at him ! The holiday of the President in those autumn days at Hyde Park usually entailed a full morning's work, but on one day the work was curtailed, and a description of that day is contained in my wife's diary :

October 19.—Another glorious, sunny day. The President drove us out for a picnic on the highest hill in Dutchess County, called Round Top Hill. The others in the party were Bill Bullitt, American Ambassador to France, and Senator Josh Lee—active-minded and amusing. We had a perfectly delightful picnic lunch which we all enjoyed so much—the President in great form, just like a boy. About 3 o'clock he took us a long drive, arriving back at Hyde Park at 6 o'clock. These drives with him are wonderful. He drives along at tremendous speed, driving himself. Small dinner party and a musical evening after dinner ; playing the piano and singing songs. A wonderful day.

What a truly lovely place is Hyde Park, standing amidst woods high up on the banks overlooking the great Hudson River. Mrs. James Roosevelt, the President's mother—then over eighty years old, but completely active in mind and body—was at Hyde Park during our stay ; a lady of wonderful charm, and of sweetness of character and disposition. Throughout the United States she was known as "Gracious Lady"—no more apt description could have been applied to her. At lunch one day she told us that she and her husband, Mr. James Roosevelt, took the President (their son Franklin) when he was four years old to see President Cleveland. The latter patted little Franklin's head and said : "There is one thing I wish you, my boy, and that is that you may never be President of the United States." After they had left the White House, Mr. James Roosevelt said to his wife : "*What a thing for the President to say to Frankie. Just as if he ever could be President of the United States.*"

From Hyde Park and all its happiness we journeyed at the end of October to Canada, and on boarding the *Duchess of Richmond* at Montreal on November 3 for our homeward voyage we found the following cable :

*Bon voyage* to you both. Come back again very soon. I miss you much at Hyde Park.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Senator Josh Lee



President Franklin D. Roosevelt      Margaret Suckley      Faith Murray

PICNIC PARTY, ROUND TOP HILL, HUDSON VALLEY, OCTOBER 19, 1938

[From a snapshot by Arthur Murray]



But ere we could again set sail for the United States the war clouds had gathered on the horizon ; the crash had come ; and freedom-loving peoples were engaged in the most stupendous struggle for liberty in all the world's history. Looking back on that visit to Hyde Park in October 1938, one thing remains to be said, and it is this,—that to Roosevelt's mind it was by that time a *certainty* that Germany definitely intended to launch another war upon civilisation. The nature of the steps which he was prepared *at that time* to take to help Great Britain in the struggle whilst America was still at peace—is another story.

In the meantime, I am permitted by Dr. G. M. Trevelyan, O.M., Master of Trinity, to publish the following correspondence between himself and me shortly after the great President's passing.

EDINBURGH, 14th April 1945

DEAR GEORGE TREVELYAN,

President Roosevelt's sad passing is a tragic loss to the world, and to me it brings great sorrow for it means the end, in this life, of a long and intimate friendship.

It did not come as a surprise to those of us who—even from a distance—have been in touch with him. The only surprise has been that he was able to stand up for so long to the tremendous burdens and responsibilities which have been his throughout the last twelve years and more.

My thoughts have turned from the President to John Tweedsmuir, who was one of his greatest friends. He had warm feelings of friendship for John, and held him, in the public sense, in the highest regard. In this connection I should like to relate to you the following little story.

In October, 1938, my wife and I were staying for ten days with the President at his lovely home, Hyde Park on the Hudson. We had previously arranged to accept John's invitation to go on from Hyde Park to visit Lady Tweedsmuir and him at Ottawa. After dinner one evening we were sitting in the big Smoking Room at Hyde Park talking—his wonderful and charming old Mother "Gracious Lady", himself, a favourite cousin of his, Margaret Suckley, Harry Hopkins, my wife and myself—when the butler brought in a letter and handed it to me. I said to the President, "May I open this?" to which he smilingly agreed. On opening the letter I found it was from John, saying that he was looking forward to the

arrival of my wife and myself at Ottawa, and ending, "Please give my love to the President". When I had finished reading the letter I said to the President: "It is a letter from John Tweedsmuir which I should like to read to you". I then read out the letter, and the President—sitting in his well-known high-backed chair, puffing at his cigarette through his famous long holder—said, "Very nice. He is a great fellow, John. I should say he is quite one of the best Governor-Generals Canada has ever had."

In my judgment history will re-echo President Roosevelt's eulogistic comment on John Tweedsmuir's great Governor-Generalship of Canada.

With every good wish,

Yours ever,

ARTHUR MURRAY

CAMBRIDGE, April 20th, 1945

DEAR ARTHUR MURRAY,

Thank you very much for yours of April 14th. I was much interested in what you say about Roosevelt. I never saw him as you did, but from what I have read and heard of him I think I like him better as a human being than any statesman in history that I know of, except Lincoln and our own dear Sir Edward. I think his fame in history will be equal with that of Lincoln. If things go even moderately well after the war it will be justly ascribed to him. And if they go badly the world will believe that if he had lived he could have made things go better, as in the cases of Lincoln and Cavour.

Yours ever,

G. M. TREVELYAN

EDINBURGH, 30th April, 1945

DEAR GEORGE TREVELYAN,

Thank you very much for your letter of April 20th. I am very greatly interested in the views you express as to the place that will be assigned in history to Franklin Roosevelt both as a human being and as a statesman.

You say in your letter: "I never saw him as you did, but from what I have read and heard of him I think I like him better as a human being than any statesman in history that I

know of, except Lincoln and our own dear Sir Edward ". That is high praise indeed, and I rejoice to hear it from one whose place in the very foremost rank of historians, and of good judges of men and affairs, is assured for all time.

It was my good fortune to know Grey and Roosevelt intimately, and to number them amongst my best friends. As a human being Grey was always to me a noble example of all the highest in thought and word and deed to which man in this life can aspire. I would not have been so *strongly* drawn to Roosevelt from the first day that I met him in 1917, had not my instinct—or I prefer to say my spirit—told me that in him I had found another Edward Grey. And the feeling that came to me that day grew stronger as the years went by. In 1919 when I went with Grey to Washington on his mission to President Wilson I brought Grey and Roosevelt together : Roosevelt was still Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy. It was a joy to me to see the delight taken in each other's company by these two great Christians—for both were men of great faith above and beyond all else. Both were men essentially good at heart, with the same broad, generous, kindly outlook on life and its problems : both possessed of a twinkling sense of humour and always cheery and laughing : both convinced that life here is but a preparation of the soul for the life which the Creator of all things promises shall be hereafter. Each had an intense admiration for the other, and in later years, either by letter or word of mouth, I would pass on messages between them. When my article on Grey appeared in the *Quarterly Review* of January 1934, I sent Roosevelt a copy of it. By letter at that time—and by word of mouth the next time that my wife and I stayed with him at the White House—he expressed himself in the warmest terms on the greatness of Grey as a human being and as a statesman.

This letter—in reply to yours—was intended to be a brief one, but my thoughts have wandered on ; and I hope I shall be forgiven for letting them wander a little further.

You say in your letter that you think Franklin Roosevelt's fame in history will be equal with that of Lincoln. " If things go even moderately well after the war ", you go on, " it will be justly ascribed to him. And if they go badly the world will believe that if he had lived he could have made things go better, as in the cases of Lincoln and Cavour."

The comparative picture you have drawn here seems to me—if I may presume to say so—to contain the essentials of what the verdict of history will be. But are there, perhaps, a few features to be added to the picture? Should there be brought into it when drawing the comparison the relative magnitude and complexities of the problems with which each statesman had to deal during the course of his Presidential career? I do not know. What we *do* know is that Roosevelt's story has shown that it is in the highest degree likely that he would have met in the same spirit and with the same firmness the problems that confronted Lincoln. And if we can say that Lincoln would have handled with the same courage, skill and success the infinitely wider and more varied problems with which Roosevelt had to deal from 1932 onwards, then the fame of each must be assigned an equal place in history.

Who can go further than that? Who, indeed ought to *want* to go further than that when assigning places on the walls of historical fame to the portraits of two such noble and mighty men?

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

ARTHUR MURRAY

CAMBRIDGE, 3rd May, 1945

DEAR ARTHUR MURRAY,

Thank you very much for yours of April 30th, which I read with *great interest*, and sympathy and agreement.

Yours ever,

G. M. TREVELYAN

One more word may be permitted—a quotation from a speech of Roosevelt's which goes to "the heart of things", and reveals the Christian ideals that animated his soul and inspired his thoughts and actions throughout his life. On May 4, 1941, he used these words:

In the tragic conflict which the world witnesses to-day, and which threatens everything we most love as a free people, we see more clearly than ever before the unyielding strength of the things of the spirit. . . . All of recorded history bears

witness that the human race has made a true advancement only as it has appreciated spiritual values. Those unhappy peoples who have placed their sole reliance on the sword have inevitably perished by the sword in the end. Physical strength can never permanently withstand the impact of spiritual force.



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